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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Agricultural credit programs play a central role in the development strategies of most 
low-income developing countries (LDCs). Policymakers believe that credit is a prerequisi te 
for adopting modern agricultural technologies. The majority of these programs are intended 
to simultaneously expand both credit demand by farmers and the supply of credit to 
agriculture. Credit programs have also been advocated on efficiency and equity grounds as a 
means of mitigating other policy bias against agriculture. Policies based on agricultural 
credit programs include certain forms of subsidies such as extended repayment periods and 
below-market interest rates. The largest sources of loanable funds have been government and 
international agencies. 
Although the motivation underlying these agricultural financial strategies sti ll appeals 
to many policymakers, recent studies (Adam and Von Pischke, 1980; Stigl itz and Weiss, 
1981 ; Adam, Graham, and Von Pischke, 1984; Braverman and Guasch. 1989; Stigli tz et aL 
1993) reveal that most credit programs have encountered problems. These problems include 
the inability of many LDCs to attain anticipated levels of agricultural productivity, increased 
inequality in credit allocation that magnifies the income gap between small-scale farmers and 
the large-scale farmers, and the increasingly weaker financia l position of special ized credit 
institutions due to widespread loan default. 
The problem of loan default is a serious one for the viability of credit programs. In 
the last decade, loan default among farm borrowers has attracted the attention of many 
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researchers. Several factors have been suggested as being responsible for default problems: 
(1) factors within the credit programs (loan conditions and delivery procedures) and 
factors outside the credit programs (culture, economics, religion, and social aspects of 
rural communities), 
(2) barriers to change on the part of credit institutions, borrowers, and governments, and 
(3) governments traditionally favoring nonfarm sector development over rural 
development. 
While these factors are important sources of loan default problems, it is how they influence 
the borrower' s loan repayment performance that remains the primary key for improving 
credit programs. 
Given the importance of credit and the frequent failure of credit programs, an 
increasing number of studies seek to identify specific factors that influence the channeling 
and managing of farm credit in LDCs. LDC governments, the United Nations (UN), and 
individual international donor countries are seeking to improve credit access and delivery to 
small-scale farmers . Without credit, it is believed that growth and development in LDCs will 
not be forthcoming, and without such development, the standard of living and productivity of 
a huge number of rural people will be threatened. 
Despite extensive research on loan default problems in LDCs, empirical evidence on 
the relationship between loan repayment performance and borrower-specific characteristics is 
not abundant. Such evidence is specifically lacking for the small-scale farmers targeted by 
credit programs since the inception of such programs in the 1960s. 
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This study seeks to relate loan and borrower characteristics to Joan repayment 
performance for Kenya's specialized credit institution, the Agricultural Finance Corporation 
(AFC). AFC has experienced default problems similar to those observed in other LDCs. In 
the past decade, AFC's most serious problems have been the declining quality of its loan 
portfolio and a chronical ly weak liquidity position due to loan default and operational losses. 
The mode of operation and environment under which AFC operates may differ from those in 
other countries, but the operational assumptions and credit policies are similar. 
Historical Justification of Farm Credit Programs 
Historically, credit programs in LDCs have been justified from several perspectives. 
The programs emerged with the increased awareness of the contribution that agriculture 
could make to economic growth and development following the technological breakthroughs 
of the 1950s (Rostow, 1960). This new awareness motivated the UN to establish the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development 
Assistance Committee in the early 1960s to assess the rationale for aid in LDCs (Jepma, 
1992). As pointed out by Hayami and Ruttan (1985), multiple technological paths that could 
greatly improve the efficiency of labor and land became available to farmers . For example, 
constraints imposed by labor shortages could be offset by mechanical technology such as 
tractors. The productivity of a given unit of land could be enhanced by biological 
technologies such as hybrid seed varieties and new livestock breeds. Complementary 
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scientific technologies included fertilizers, herbicides, and irrigation systems. all requiring 
access to capital. 
Most farmers were unable to fund farm projects solely from their own resources, a 
situation that arrested agricultural growth and development (World Bank, 1975). Of great 
concern was the majority of relatively poor, small-scale-farmers. The status of these farmers 
in terms of initial resource endowment, access to regular financial markets. technical and 
managerial know-how, and the services necessary for adopting these technologies was 
perceived to be relatively weak. Agriculture provided these farmers with between 3 percent 
and 92 percent employment opportunities, through which they contributed between 4 percent 
and 62 percent to gross domestic product (GDP) (Martinu and Pes'kova. 1990). The view 
taken by many was that rural development required widespread access to resources so that 
benefits would be spread broadly among the target populations (Lele, 1987). 
The farm sector in many LDCs suffered biases in credit allocation by private lenders 
due to the high risk and administrati ve costs that characterized lending to the agricultural 
sector. On average, the agricultural sector received a very small share of credit (e.g., 10 
percent in Bangladesh; 15 percent in Thailand, the Philippines, and Mexico; and 27 percent 
in India) (Lipton, 1981 ), of which small-scale farmers received the smallest allocation. 
According to many observers. the poorest strata of these farmers had historically relied 
mainly on private moneylenders who were believed to be exploitative and needed to be 
disqualified and suppressed (Adam and Von Pischke, 1980). Without government 
5 
intervention in credit allocation, it was believed that the gap in income distribution between 
the rural poor and rich would worsen over time. 
Another justification for farm credit programs was the need to link land reforms with 
technological dissemination as a development strategy (Von Pischke, 1981 ). This link was 
important because most LDCs were in the process of attaining their independence. 1n East 
and Central Africa, for example, colonial administrations left behind immense inequalities in 
land distribution. It was believed that bestowing land ownership rights to individual farmers 
was an appropriate land refonn strategy; it improved the farmers· ability to extract the 
highest returns from land while improving their creditworthiness (Feder et al. , 1988). 
However, such land reform required capital. 
Other justifications were based on anticipated biases in of food product prices, 
distorted exchange rates and inefficient marketing systems during the development process. 
It was argued that low interest rates on farm Joans provided by specialized credit progran1s 
could compensate farmers for any adverse effects resulting from price or income policies. 
In certain instances, governments and international lending agencies fo und it easier to 
initiate credit programs and extend credit than to initiate other reforms such as land tenure 
and marketing policies. This practice appealed to policymakers and encouraged them to use 
credit as a reform and development tool (Adam and Von Pischke, 1980; Bravennan and 
Guasch, 1989). 
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International Agencies Involved in Farm Credit Programs 
The major international development agencies that have supported specialized 
agricultural credit programs in LDCs include the World Bank and it affiliates, the 
International Development Agency (IDA), the International Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD); the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
and private banks (Adam and Von Pischke, 1992). The World Bank has supported credit 
programs in nearly all LDCs. The United States initially promoted credit programs 
throughout Latin America and parts of Africa. Several European countries have supported 
cooperative movements in Africa as a potential source of grassroots participation in credit 
programs, inputs, and commodity markets. 
Credit terms have not been uniform across these agents; for example, intermediate 
production credit advanced by IBRD has generally had a grace period of five years with 
repayment over a period of three to fifteen years (World Bank, Various issues) . Interest rates 
charged by IBRD reflect its cost of funds. On the other hand, IDA lends to poorer 
developing countries with per capita gross national product (GNP) of US $650 or less (in 
1988 dollars). Forty countries qualify for IDA credit, of which twenty-seven are African 
nations. Credits from IDA are made to governments and normally provide a ten year grace 
period with maturities ranging from thirty to forty years. 
Table 1.1 shows World Bank lending to agricultural credit programs in LDCs through 
IBRD and IDA, by region, from fiscal year (FY) 1980/81 through 1990/91. These agencies 
have played important direct and indirect roles in designing, establishing, funding, and 
7 
staffing specialized agricultural credit institutions in LDCs (Von Pischke, 1981 ). In many 
countries, these institutions are the single largest sources of agricultural credit and often 
operate side by side with a nationwide network of rural credit cooperatives. However, their 
relative importance as a source of total credit to the agricultural sector varies from country to 
country (Table 1.2). In some Asian countries where informal financial markets provide an 
average of 60 percent to 70 percent of rural credit, the relative importance of these 
institutions is lower compared to their importance in countries where such markets are less 
developed. The latter is the situation in much of Africa. 
Table 1.1 World Bank direct lending to agricultural credit programs in LDCs, FY 1980/81 
90/91 (million US$) 
Europe, Middle Latin America 
East, and North and the 
Africa Asia Africa Caribbean 
--------- -------------· - - --------- ---------· 
Year IBRD IDA IBRD IDA IBRD IDA IRBD IDA 
1980/81 8.5 71.0 1,3 1.5 1,178.8 983 .5 96.2 345.4 23.0 
1981182 33.5 92.5 256.6 1,358.8 997.5 96.2 706.4 23.5 
1982/83 33.5 126.5 446.5 1,518.0 1,092.5 96.2 706.4 23.5 
1983/84 33.5 232.2 526.5 1,566.6 1,242.9 104.2 921.4 23.5 
1984/85 283.5 231.9 526.5 1,836.6 1,358.3 104.2 1,251.9 23.5 
1985/86 283.5 275.6 651.5 1,836.6 1,612.3 104.2 1,307.9 23.5 
1986/87 283.5 283.1 1,293 .3 1,984. l 1,732.3 104.2 1,487.9 23.5 
1987/88 293.5 293 .1 1,293.3 1,884.1 1,793.3 104.2 1 935.9 23.5 
1988/89 283.5 311.4 1,268.5 2,154.3 1,002.3 304.0 2,357.4 23.5 
1989/90 319.8 333.4 1,287.9 1,984.1 2,610.3 138.0 2,445.4 15.0 
1990/91 319.8 369.1 1,287.9 2, 154.3 2,798.8 305.5 2 627.4 23.5 
Source: World Bank Annual Report, Various issues. 
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The rate of increase of Africa's debt has declined substantially since the mid-l 980s 
compared to earlier periods (Figure 1.1 ). Compared to Latin America, Africa' s debt burden 
has been more crippling and represents a higher proportion of GNP; over 90 percent in 1987 
compared to 60 percent for Latin America and 15 percent for China (0' Connor, 1991 ). 
Africa' s debt service ratio, which relates annual scheduled payments to interest and principal 
annual export earnings, worsened due to falling export earning, in the 1980s. For most 
individual African countries, this ratio is now between 40 percent and 50 percent. Debt 
burden has thus limited further borrowing capacity for many African countries. 
Table 1.2. Relative importance of specialized government-sponsored Agricultural financial 
institutions in selected countries 
Country 
India 
Nigeria 
Bangladesh 
Zambia 
China 
Rwanda 
Ghana 
Kenya 
Japan 
United 
Year 
1992 
1989 
1987 
1987 
1989 
1991 
1991 
1992 
1983 
Percentage 
Share of 
Total 
Agricultural 
Credit 
33 .0 
18.0 
13.5 
15.7 
6.4 
4.0 
23.0 
20.0 
18.0 
Source 
Ghate, 1992 
Mbatia, 1991 
Kashem, 1987 
Allen, 1987 
Feder et al., 1989 
Adholla et al., 1991 
Adholla et al., 1991 
Agricultural Finance Corporation of Kenya, 1992 
Asian Productivity Organization, 1985 
States 1987 17.0 Belongia and Gilbert, 1987 
Note: Japan and the United States are included in this table for comparison purposes. In 
these two countries, the percentage share of credit provided is within the average of that in 
LDCs. 
3550 
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Objectives and Operational Experiences of Farm Credit Programs 
Farm credit programs in LDCs were designed to pursue specific development 
objectives (Hayami and Ruttan. 1985: Meier. 1989). The programs were part of a system for 
resource allocation that transferred financial resources over time to individuals engaged in 
agricultural production. Financial intermediation in agriculture was thus expected to 
facilitate agricultural productivity, particularly within the small-scale-farm sector. As a 
result. accelerated growth in productivity meant an increase in jobs and income, equitable 
distribution of wealth, and upgraded living standards of the target group. 
At the national level, a wide range of strategies was available to achieve these 
objectives. First, investment could be directed toward labor-intensive industries to create 
new jobs. Second. trade linkages could be created between farm sector input-output markets 
and other sectors. Third, credit could be directed toward farm technologies that transfer labor 
to 0th.er sectors or help meet labor shortages. This transfer could free up farmers ' time and 
allow them to expand or intensify production. Last. loans could be granted directly to 
individuals and incorporated groups, or indirectly through cooperative societies. Credit 
systems could allow for credit interlinkage within the agricultural marketing system. On an 
individual basis. credit recipients could adopt new agricultural technologies and increase 
productivity. 
The effectiveness of credit programs has been debated. The first major performance 
evaluation of farm credit programs was the 1973 IDA Spring Review of Small Farm Credit 
by the World Bank (World Bank, 1973). This study raised several issues regarding the initial 
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experiences of credit programs. including credit allocation. credit impact. and institutional 
development of credit institutions. 
Targeting small-scale farmers 
Targeting credit and creating incentives for its use have been among the most 
important and difficult challenges in rural credit delivery in LDCs. The choice of regu latory 
procedures and the combination of incentives have significantly determined the success of 
the credit objectives. For a variety of reasons. performance of these programs in LDCs has 
generally been considered a failure (Gonzales-Vega. 1983: Adam. Graham. and Von Pischke. 
1983: Llanto. 1988: Germidis, 1990; Adam and Von Pischke. 1992; Yaron. 1992; Hoff and 
tiglitz. 1993). Credit programs have fai led to efficiently improve income distribution or to 
al leviate poverty among small-scale farmers . The common features of these fa iled attempts 
have been loans benefiting wea lthy large-scale farmers instead of small-scale farmers. 
skyrocketing arrears, loan diversion to nonagricultural investments, and finan.cia lly weak and 
inefficient credit institutions. 
Braverman and Guasch (1989) estimated that only 5 percent of farms in Africa and 
about 15 percent of farms in Asia and Latin America have had access to formal credit. 
Shirota, Araujo, and Meyer ( 1990) observed that a significant number of small-scale farmers 
in Brazil had not been reached by large and extensive agricultural credit programs over a 
fifteen-year period, during which huge amow1ts credit were channeled to the agricultural 
sector. They found that credit distribution is often concentrated in more commercialized 
regions. thereby excluding potential participants in less commercialized regions. 
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The effects of credit programs on agricultural productivity have not been easy to 
establish. Several studies have attempted to compare productivity between small and large 
farms (Rao and Chotigeat, 1981 ; Feder, 1985). These studies found an inverse relationship 
between farm size and output per acre, and that small farms have a relatively high labor-to-
land ratio. Although these findings are not conclusive, the relatively higher levels of loans 
received by large farm holders were not justified on efficiency grounds. 
Interest subsidies within farm credit systems are seen as favoring only those obtaining 
credit and not the entire agricultural sector, thereby distorting the cost of agricultural 
investments. For example, Shirota. Araujo, and Meyer (1990) showed that the ratios of 
interest subsidies to agricultural GDP and to overall country GDP in Brazil , were between 7 
percent and J I percent and 2. 1 percent, respectively, between 1979 and 1980 (periods of 
high inflation). As a result, agricultural credit institutions became targets for financial 
arbitrage. It has therefore been argued that interest subsidies have had a degenerative effect 
on production efficiency. The programs also have had limited portfolio diversification, and 
the absence of farm production insurance as part of farm credit programs increased the 
vulnerability of producers to climatic production risks. 
If a high loan recovery rate is considered the measure of success for a lending 
institution, these specialized credit institutions have failed dismally. Studies confirm a 
general inability of credit institutions to enforce legal loan contracts--evidenced by the 
growth of loans in arrears. Reports indicate that poor loan recovery has been a major 
deterrent to the sustainability of credit institutions (Adam and Vegel, 1986; Yaron, 1992). 
13 
Continuous inflow of external and government funds to these institutions has contributed to 
laxity in Joan collection, despite ever-rising loan default problems. For example, an 
estimated 30 percent to 95 percent of agricultural credit portfolios in the Middle East, Africa, 
and Latin America are in arrears (Braverman and Guasch. 1989). Moreover, borrowers have 
developed poor attitudes toward these government-sponsored institutions, perceiving them as 
charitable organizations (Vegel, 1984). Also, these institutions have appealed to politicians 
as an easy ground for patronage, thereby encouraging abuse and misuse. Deliberate and 
negative misconceptions by politicians about the essential nature of credit have been 
recognized as a source of negative borrower attitudes and poor credit discipline. 
Success stories 
It is encouraging to note that, despite problems, some programs have met with 
success. In general, LDCs in East, Southeast, and South Asia are considered more successful 
in using credit programs than are LDCs in Latin America and Africa (Ruttan, 1987). 
Identifying the unique features of successful programs is important for the reform efforts 
currently underway. The common features of successful programs are enumerated by 
Braverman and Gausch (1989). These features include tough stands on default, strict 
auditing, accountability, and financial control of the lender. Braverman and Gausch noted 
that some joint responsibility of grouped borrowers instilled credit discipline. For group 
borrowing, default of at least one of the group members means denial of credit to the whole 
group. 
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Y aron (1992) notes success stories in terms of institutional financial viability in the 
republics of Korea and Taiwan. In these republics, Joan collection rates have exceeded 90 
percent. Interestingly, cooperatives are involved in most of these success stori es. It is 
believed that China's strong cooperative system aids lenders in capturing useful information 
regarding the financial behavior of borrowers and assessing their creditworthiness. 
Borrowers are likely to repay more promptly because they know that lenders have full 
knowledge of their incomes. The cooperatives provide farrn inputs, fann product marketing. 
savings and credit, some kinds of insurance, and technical education. Perhaps the most 
important distinguishing feature of cooperatives is their holistic approach. Transaction costs 
are considerably reduced in terms of time saved running between several agents to secure 
credit and inputs and to sell output. On the lender's side, a strong relationship is established 
with the farmers, thereby reducing adverse selection and moral haz.ard problems. Lenders 
also enjoy reduced transaction costs. 
Other researchers contend that, to some extent, small-scale farmers in LDCs have 
generally benefited from credit programs, but it has been difficult to precisely separate the 
impact of credit from the impact of other economic policies. Recent credit models have 
shown that small-scale farmers indirectly benefit from agricultural credi t programs through 
the trickle-down effects of supply-led credit (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1993). These models hold 
that when large amounts of loanable funds are supplied to one agent, the demand for credit 
from other agents is reduced, which in turn drives down interest rates. According to Hoff and 
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Stiglitz these indirect benefits to small-scale farmers may explain why informal credit 
markets have become popular in some regions. 
Institutional constraints and limitations 
The traditional rationale on which credit programs were based presumed financial 
constraint of small-scale farmers, sometimes from discriminatory lending practices by formal 
lenders. This situation has not been found to be the case in all regions. In China, Thailand, 
and Zambia, for example, small-scale farmers preferred the more flexible and cheaper 
services of informal lenders over commercial or governmental institutions; only a small 
percentage were financially constrained (Allen, 1987; Feder et al. , 1989). In Brazil, 90 
percent of small-scale farmers did not request any form of credit between 1978 and 1989 
(Shirota, Aurojo, and Meyer, 1990). Other traditional justifications--that credit shortages 
retard adoption of new technologies, for example--are refuted by Graham and Firestine 
(1984) and Yaron (1992). They argue that technologies are divisible and can be adopted 
progressively. Unless the new technologies require a huge up-front investment with returns 
spread over time, credit is not the correct mechanism for motivating a farmer to adopt the 
technologies. Besides, new techniques cannot be adopted in an adverse product-pricing 
environment, with or without a loan (which is a frequent problem in many LDCs). 
Farmers' ingenuity in improving their incomes has created inefficiencies in credit 
programs. Farmers facing bureaucratic systems have used credit institutions as sources of 
funds for nonagricultural ventures that may offer better income opportunities. The credit 
programs have thus often failed to become instruments for upgrading farm technology, 
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increasing agricultural productivity, or improving the long-run income status of small-scale 
farmers. 
According to Borlaug ( 1990), these problems have been closely related to 
infrastructural constraints and price incentives. For example, a majority of African countries 
did not link agricultural research and production activities to promoting, exploiting, and 
disseminating more and better technologies. Such activities remain an important challenge 
for reversing Africa's economic woes. Poor economic performance was characteri zed by the 
fail ure of policymakers to develop complementary technologies such as adequate storage 
facilities, redistribution, and marketing systems to absorb higher yields. African countries 
caught in thi s predicament often manipulated prices, which resulted in variability of yields. 
During bumper harvests, prices went down and farmers kept their harvest for consumption 
and looked for nonfarm income opportunities. This outcome may partly explain why farmers 
in countries such as Malawi have insisted on growing the local flint maize, which they 
contend tastes and stores better than the " improved" dent (Lele, 1989). 
According to Krause et al. (1990), other major impediments are the inability of small -
scaJe farmers to bear the combined business and financial risks posed by adopting new 
technologies and the lack of development within credit institutions to reduce these risks. 
Other expressed problems relate to the fungibility of money (Y aron, 1992; Feder et al., 1989; 
Adam and Von Pischke, 1983). Fungibility problems have made it increasingly costly for 
lenders to separate household expenditures and easily account for expenses directly 
connected to credit. Credit may therefore only generate a negligible increase in agricu ltural 
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productivity unless a very strict supervision system is followed, which may in tum be cost-
ineffective. 
Lenders have to be consistently committed to monitoring borrowers in the use of 
funds and taking appropriate action to force violators to correct their ways. The lender's 
action must provide visible examples to encourage other borrowers to maintain desired 
behavior. Attempts by lenders to monitor and enforce contracts have often resulted in over-
staffing, which further boosts lending costs (Adam and Von Pischke, 1992). The very lack of 
monitoring means that evidence of noncompliance is manifested in loan default and 
diversion. 
Reduction of undesired behavior through effective monitoring and enforcement of 
contracts takes two paths, both of which require high investment in information collection. 
The first path concentrates on monitoring the effort level of borrowers and making it less 
likely for default problems to arise. The second involves enforcing credit contracts, 
improving credit discipline, and eliminating inefficient borrowers. 
Little research has focused on identifying and attaching some objective value to 
factors that influence loan default in LDCs. It is believed that each factor has a relative 
influence on the borrower-lender relationship and subsequent loan repayment performance. 
From a practical perspective, knowledge of the relative level and potential influence of each 
factor can help improve the success of credit programs 
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Problem Statement 
Rural credit is an important government intervention in developing of the agricultural 
sector in LDCs. Credit programs represent government attempts to create credit markets for 
small-scale farmers . The choice of institutional arrangements to facilitate coordination of 
credit allocation and use significantly determines the achievement of developmental goals. 
Financial institutions establish expectations and rules about the rightful use of credit and the 
partitioning of income streams resulting from its use. To perform these functions, 
institutions must be stable over time and ready to change with developmental advancements. 
Past institutional policy arrangements introduced in most LDCs to facilitate the development 
process have had a number of problems. One of the most serious problems is financial 
instability resulting from loan default. Kenya is no exception to this dilemma (Kenya, 
Economic Review 1989). 
Virtually every default case has many potential causes, both internal and external. 
Identifying the causes of default, assessing the characteristics of defaulters, and quantifying 
the relative potentiality of factors that influence default provide a reasonable approach to 
evaluating the problem. Researchers have used a broad range of factors to estimate the 
proportion of default attributable to specific factors in many regions. 
The environments under which particular credit programs operate may differ 
significantly, however. The environment is therefore a relative unknown, as are the socio-
economic characteristics of farm borrowers, which are important in distinguishing their 
relative repayment abilities. It is important to develop an environment-specific model to 
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assess the characteristics affecting repayment ability. Several researchers have observed that 
there is no definitive set of explanatory variables for these models (Miller and LaDue. 1989; 
Ellinger, Splett, and Barry, 1992). They contend that each lender reacts differently to a given 
situation, depending on the circumstances. 
In Kenya, default rates for the specialized credit institution AFC have been growing 
rapidly (Agricultural Finance Corporation of Kenya, 1993). In 1980, the average default rate 
was 43 percent; by 1992. it had grown to an average of 57 percent. This default rate is 
typical of many credit programs in LDCs, as Braverman and Guasch (1989) point out. 
Usually, a project program has two phases in repayment rate: very high in the early stages 
and progressively deteriorating toward the end of the project period. Toward the end of these 
projects, Joan screening quality declines, and loan collection and supervision are often lax. 
Borrowers have a strong incentive to default because the prospects for future loans under that 
project diminish. For AFC, however, default rates have remained consistently high with all 
programs. 
Assuming that both lenders and borrowers are operating under rigid and bureaucratic 
policies, it is not practical for either group to take full advantage of repayment risk strategies. 
Borrowers are able to resort to political patronage and fall back on a wide range of reasons 
when default problems begin to appear. Many believe that this tendency is the result of poor 
credit discipline among some borrowers. On the other hand, some farmers are willing to 
repay their debts regardless of default opportunities. It would therefore follow that 
performing borrowers have the incentive to repay, perhaps through a determined, skillful, or 
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shrewd plan to maintain a healthy relationship with the lender. As a result, studies aimed at 
identi fying factors that influence loan repayment performance should consider both 
defau lters and nondefaulters. Several questions present themselves. What motivates those 
who repay their Joans fully or partially and what demotivates those who do not? Are there 
specific characteristics that significantly distinguish those who pay from those who do not? 
If so, can lenders take advantage of these characteristics in making loan decision, and predict 
an applicant ' s expected performance? These questions underlie this research effort. 
Objectives of the Study 
From the preceding discussion, it can be concluded that the factors that influence loan 
default are interrelated in a complex manner. This study attempts to measure the relative 
contribution of the factors identified as being important in the loan repayment behavior of 
Kenya 's AFC borrowers. The specific objectives are to: 
(1) consider insights of previous studies examining firm failure and loan default 
characteristics, 
(2) analyze Kenya's AFC operational practices and constraints and evaluate its financial 
performance for the FY 1980/81-1992/93, 
(3) ana lyze default trends within loan and borrower characteristics and identify factors 
that influence loan repayment performance among AFC borrowers, 
(4) formulate hypotheses and empirically test selected repayment performance 
characteristics, and 
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(5) draw conclusions about the relationships between repayment performance and loan 
and borrower characteristics for lending decisions. 
Thesis Organization 
The contents of the study are organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces Kenya as a 
case study. First, the chapter presents Kenya's location. geographic features, and 
administrative provinces. Then; Chapter 2 reviews Kenya' s economy, agriculture, and 
agricultural credit and presents an analysis of the current status of AFC, Kenya's main 
government-sponsored credit institution. The analysis of AFC provides a factual background 
from which the loan default analysis will subsequently be explored. Chapter 3, the 
conceptual framework for the loan default analysis and the literature review are provided. 
Chapter 4 describes the analytical procedures used for this study. Chapter 5 provides the 
results of the analysis, a discussion, and the summary and conclusions for the study. 
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CHAPTER 2: AN OVERVIEW OF KENYA'S ECONOMY, AGRICULTURE, AND 
FARM CREDIT SYSTEM 
This chapter introduces Kenya as a case study. First the Chapter presents Kenya's 
location, geographic features , and administrative provinces. Then the chapter reviews 
Kenya' s economy, agriculture, and agricultural credit, presents an analysis of the current 
status of AFC, Kenya's main government-sponsored credit institution for the agricultural 
sector. In particular, this section emphasizes the role of the AFC as a specialized agricultural 
credit institution. The objectives, operation, procedures, and current financial status of AFC 
are discussed. Finally, an analysis of AFC operations for the FY 1980/81 to 1991 /92 is 
presented. 
Location, Geographic Features, and Administrative Provinces 
Kenya lies astride the equator on the eastern border of the African continent, bounded 
by the Indian Ocean and five countries. Counterclockwise from the Indian Ocean, Somalia is 
to the north, followed by Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, and Tanzania directly to the south. 
Kenya covers an area of 580,367 square kilometers. Included are 11 ,230 square kilometers 
of water, mainly Lake Turkana and a portion of Lake Victoria. Kenya is ranked number 
twenty-second in size among sub-Saharan African countries. 
One-third of Kenya is semi-arid: barren, brown, and sun-burnt land. One-third is 
highland: mountains, forest, lakes, and farmland, much of it fertile. The remaining one third 
is Savannah grassland. Less than 15 percent of the country, mainly the coastal and 
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southwestern highland regions, receives reliable annual rainfall of 760 millimeters or more. 
Most of the country experiences two wet seasons (February-May and September-October) 
and two dry seasons (November-December and June-August). The overall panem of rainfall 
is highly erratic, particularly in areas of low precipitation. Intermittent drought affects the 
entire country. In the highlands, the climate is temperate. while the coastal areas are humid 
and hot. 
For administrative purposes, Kenya is divided into seven provinces (with the capital 
city. Nairobi , granted the special status of province), and 41 districts (Figure 2.1). The Rift 
Valley province is the largest, stretching from the desert around Lake Turkana in the Turkana 
district (36) bordering Sudan, to the Kajiado district (28) along the border of Tanzania. The 
Rift Valley province contains land with the highest agricultural potential. 
Kenya's Economy: Background and Trends 
At the time of independence in 1963 Kenya's economy was based on a well-
established modem agriculture operated mainly by colonial settlers. Post-independence 
economic strategies focused on agriculture for economic growth and development. The 
government emphasized the economic philosophy of private investment in the agricultural 
sector. Land redistribution and privatization were agricultural incentives used to encourage 
private investment and to ensure widespread participation of indigenous Kenyans in 
development. 
Kenya 's economy displays the same characteristics of the economies of other 
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developing countries. Agriculture dominates, contributing about 30 percent of GDP (Table 
2. 1 ). The manufacturing (domestic small industries) and industrial (large production units 
such as tourism) sectors contribute an average of 12 percent and 20 percent, respectively, to 
GDP Agriculture is the leading foreign exchange earner and the single largest employer. 
Kenya has achieved reasonable growth in GDP since achieving independence. The 
relative contribution of the three sectors--agriculture, industry, and manufacturing--to GOP 
has remained unchanged. As Ricardo ( 1960) points out, growth and productivity in 
agriculture limit growth in nonagricultural sectors. In a healthy economy, the contribution of 
the agricultural sector to GDP would typically decline as the other sectors progressively 
expanded through market and factor contributions from the agricultural sector (Kuznets, 
1965). As agriculture grows, it makes a market contribution by purchasing production items 
from the other sectors at home and abroad and a factor contribution by transferring resources 
such as labor to the other economic sectors. The cumulative growth rate of GNP between 
1981 and 1990 is evidence that Kenya's economic progress has been declining in rea l terms 
(Table 2.2). 
Kenya's economy is dependent on export earnings from the agricultural sector. This 
situation determines Kenya's financial condition. The export sector also determines the 
import level of essential agricultural inputs, and the ability of the country to meet external 
debt repayments. Export earnings growth in nominal terms between 1966 and 1980 averaged 
12.8 percent annually, reflecting a steep rise in commodity prices (Rosen and Shapouri , 
1989). 
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Table 2.1. Contribution of Kenya's agriculture, industry, and manufacturing sectors to GDP 
GDP 
(million Agriculture Industry Manufacturing 
Year current US$) (%) (%) (%) 
1960 330 35 18 11 
1965 358 31 20 12 
1970 573 33 20 12 
1981 3,039 27 22 12 
1982 3,515 28 21 11 
1983 3,888 31 20 12 
1984 4,448 31 19 11 
1985 5,037 30 20 12 
1986 5,874 31 20 13 
1987 6,523 31 21 12 
1988 7,470 33 20 12 
1989 7,929 38 18 9 
1990 8,404 33 22 13 
1991 8,787 32 21 13 
Source: World Development Report, Various issues. 
Table 2.2. Kenya's GNP per capita and population 
Growth of 
GNP Population Period GNP 
Year per Capita (US $) (million) (years) per Capita 
1981 420 17.4 1960-81 2.9 
1982 390 18. l 1960-82 2.8 
1983 340 18.9 1960-83 2.3 
1984 310 19.6 1960-84 2 .1 
1985 290 20.4 1960-85 1.9 
1986 300 21.2 1960-86 1.9 
1987 330 22.l 1960-87 1.9 
1988 340 22.9 1960-88 2.0 
1989 360 23 .5 1960-89 2.0 
1990 370 24.2 1960-90 1.9 
Source: FAQ Production and Trade Yearbook, Various issues 
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Between 1980 and 1986 this growth had decl ined to -2.6 percent. Real growth fo r the 
periods 1966-80 and 1980-86 were 0.3 percent and -0.9 percent, respecti vely. Although the 
volwne of exports expanded, low commodity prices had adverse effects on growth. Table 
2.3 shows Kenya's index of export volwne and the index for unit value (in US dollars) 
between 1966 and 1989. For the period 1966-80, the percentage annual growth of export 
volwne was 3.44 percent. Growth then dropped to 0.26 percent between I 980 and 1986. 
The index for the unit value dropped drastically from an average of 10.1 1 percent for the 
period 1966-80 to -5.15 percent for the period 1980-89, a drop of about 150 percent. 
Import growth for the period 1966-80 averaged 15.6 percent annually. Due to 
shortfalls in exports, this growth was reduced to -I 0.6 percent annually between 1980-86. 
Export share of GDP, which was 3 1 percent in 1965, declined to 27 percent in 1986. In 
1990, Kenya tried to initiate export incentive schemes which provided access to inputs at 
international prices through manufacturing under the bond scheme and the exemption scheme 
(Kenya, Weekly Review, 1992). The traditional quantitative restrictions were removed and 
replaced by tariff protection in the import sector. The tariff system was expected to obtain 
efficiency in revenue collection and to reduce the level of effective protection by reducing the 
tariff bands from 25 to 10. 
Sources of adverse economic trends 
From 1965 through the 1970s, policies were outlined and strategies adopted that 
increased government investment in agriculture. The 1980s were a period of adjustment and 
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re-adjustment of strategies based on the outcomes of the strategies adopted earlier. This 
second period has been a difficult one. 
Kenya experienced acce lerated economic growth from 1963 until 1972. Agricultural 
productivity increased as new land was put into production. International prices for Kenya's 
chief export crops--coffee and tea--were favorable. The annual average growth rate in GDP 
of 6.7 percent, and GNP growth averaged 5 percent. Talcing into account population gro,¥th 
of 3.6 percent during the same period still meant 3.1 percent per capita GNP growth. Three 
main factors contributing to this growth are related to agriculture: expansion of land area for 
cash crops, increased participation of small holders in production, and the introduction of 
high-yielding maize and wheat varieties. Emphasis on farm credit availability facilitated 
increased agricultural output. 
Kenya's major economic gro\¥th problems began in 1973 when external and internal 
forces confronted the country, and gro\¥th has fluctuated considerably since. The first 
external force was the high price of oi l in 1973. Kenya was li sted by the World Bank Annual 
Report ( 1985) as one of thirty LDCs that was heavily affected by the rise in oil prices. 
Increased coffee productivity in Brazil and the collapse of world coffee prices necessitated 
repeated devaluation of the Kenya shilling (Ksh.) from Ksh. 7.33/US dollar in 1979 to Ksh. 
13. 79/US dollar by the end of 1983. This was followed by worldwide inflation and recession 
that greatly increased interest rates for external borrowing. Coffee and tea fetched low prices 
in world markets. The collapse of the East African Community--a regional trade agreement 
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Table 2.3 . Index of export volume and unit value of Kenya's exports 
Year 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
197 1 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Source: Rosen and Shapouri, 1989. 
Export Volume (%) 
66 
63 
67 
80 
84 
64 
96 
112 
102 
97 
103 
107 
99 
97 
100 
102 
109 
118 
11 6 
93 
100 
102 
104 
103 
1966-86 ( 1980 = I 00) 
Unit Value(%) 
25.4 
25.4 
25.7 
26.0 
28.5 
27.4 
28.5 
33.5 
43.4 
48.6 
57.6 
82.7 
74.8 
82.5 
100.0 
89.9 
81.9 
80.6 
89.3 
77.3 
78.5 
77. 1 
80.9 
83.4 
among Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania--due to trade and political disagreements among the 
three countries eliminated the market for Kenya's manufactured goods. 
Internal problems that persistently affected Kenya's economy were erratic weather, 
which resulted in fluctuations in agricultural output, and the decline in exports. Pricing and 
marketing of most cash crops were controlled by the government, and prices were often low, 
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thereby creating disincentives to producers. Marketing procedures were cumbersome and 
costly to the government and to farmers. Kenya's inflation rates were between 0 percent and 
3 percent per year from 1966 though 1972 (Mwega and Killick, 1990). Between 1973 In 
1986, however, inflation averaged 12 percent per year. After falling to 6 percent, the rate of 
inflation has risen to an average 27 percent in 1993. 
Kenya· s monetary policies had the strongest direct impact on domestic inflation and 
GNP growth. Mwega and Killick (1990) noted that the budget deficit always dominated 
monetary changes. It has been difficult for the authorities to manipulate domestic credit in 
the public sector, especially from nonbank. financial institutions that substitute for bank 
credit. Policies aimed at reducing total lending by commercial banks are matched almost 
shilling-for-shilling by an increase in nonbank institutions. 
Since 1963, Kenya's population has more than tripled. This increase has created 
pressure both on land resources and services. Population growth, which has been steadi ly 
over 3 percent per year has offset all or most of the gross productivity gains that have been 
made. 
As these problems persisted, the government fell short of meeting economic 
commitments and the social demands of a fast-growing population. As a result, Kenya's 
dependence on fore ign funds progressively grew. Although Kenya managed to reduce its 
deficit by a level equivalent to 3.7 percent of the GDP in 1991, the foreign debt stock stood at 
US $7,014 million with arrears of US $108 million (World Bank Development Report, 
1992). The ratio of present value to nominal value of debt in 1991 was 77 .3 percent. 
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Throughout 1992. Kenya· s economy was in a deep slump. GDP growth decl ined to an 
unprecedented 0.4 percent, agricultural productivity was -4.8 percent, and inflation escalated 
to 27 percent. 
Proposals for economic reforms 
Since achieving independence, Kenya has clearly been on a downhill trend 
economically. Common features of such a trend include uneven, sometimes negative real per 
capital income growth chronic deficits on external and internal fiscal accounts, and high 
inflation. Around 1989, Kenya lost good relationships with its bilateral donors, resulting in 
the freezing of disbursements of US $350 million worth of economic aid . The strained 
relations were due to Kenya' s fai lure to pursue structural and political adjustments (Kenya, 
Weekly Review, 1993). Enforcement of laws, respect for human rights, and firm action 
against corruption were lacking. Fiscal discipline and civil service reforms. improvements in 
efficiency and financial performance, accountability of public enterprises. and the 
establishment of an environment for growth of private sector were required adjustments. 
Intense economic turmoil in 199 1-93 forced Kenya to reform. Economic reforms 
focused on fiscal management and monetary control for reducing internal and external debt 
and the budget deficit. The government expected reduced expenditures, improved revenue 
collection, and improved fi scal discipline to stabilize the money supply . The tightened 
monetary policy showed positive results by pushing down the Treasury Bill tender rate from 
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73 percent in June 1993 to 49 percent by November 1993. The exchange rate dropped from 
Ksh. 82/US dollar in June 1993 to below Ksh. 73/US dollar by October 1993. 
Of its the 205 public enterprises, Kenya was arranging to privatize 45 and liquidate 
20. Key public enterprises continue to restructure. These adjustments are an anempt to 
improve efficiency in financial resource use. The main agricultural credit enterprises are 
expected to be more competitive. Liberalization toward a more free market approach and 
decreased government involvement in the economy are options that Kenya recognizes as 
important. 
Economic events in Kenya have had direct impacts on the agricultural sector. The 
most immediate impacts have been the growing debt to finance agricultural producers who 
are not able to repay their debts and the inability of the government to maintain a consistent 
supply of farm inputs and services. The rising cost of impo.rted agricultural inputs such as 
fertilizers and herbicides has made it increasingly difficult for small-scale farmers to adopt 
such inputs. Supplies of ferti li zer and insecticides are restricted or interrupted. In addition, 
agricultural extension services have been cut because of budget constraints. 
Other impacts on the agricultural sector include instability in production due to 
tremendous government involvement in agricultural activities through public enterprises. 
Public enterprises have often been favored on efficiency grounds; however, studies have 
shown that their mode of operation has been a hindrance to efficiency in the agricultural 
sector. The frequent financial deficits of public enterprises have been a great burden to the 
government and even more so to farmers. The non-export crop sector, which is the main 
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source of livelihood for a large rural population, has been neglected since independence was 
achieved in 1963. To some extent, the government has failed to understand the management 
and institutional innovations that are necessary for development in this sector. 
The following section provides an overview of the agricultural sector and its 
contribution to economic development in Kenya. 
The Agricultural Sector 
Performance 
In 1963, the agricultural sector contributed about 38 percent to GDP, 88 percent to 
employment, and 57 percent to export earnings. Three decades later. this sector contributed 
about 32 percent to GDP, 76.5 percent to employment, and 62 percent to export earnings 
(Table 2.4). Overall , agriculture's contribution to employment has declined, but at a slow 
pace. Its contributions to export earnings have been small and stagnant. The rate of growth 
in GDP and in agricultural productivity fluctuated widely over the period. The broad pattern 
of productivity of land and labor resources is seen in average per capita output presented in 
Figure 2.2. Average per capita output is commonly expressed as a ratio of per capita income 
from agriculture to total labor or land engaged in agricultural production. Figure 2.2 shows 
the per capita growth rate of land and labor, and the decline in the ratio of agricultural 
population to land. The decline in the land/labor ratio is not surprising considering 
population growth averaging 3.8 percent per year since 1963. Of greater concern is the rate 
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of growth of land per capita, which should be far higher than population growth if Kenya is 
to achieve notable improvements in economic growth. 
Land potential 
Land base and utilization 
Kenya has a relatively small land base (Figure 2.3). Only 12 percent of its land is 
classified as having high agricultural potential. Over 70 percent of the land has low 
agricultural potential and about 9 percent is unusable for agricultural purposes. 
Figure 2.3 and Table 2.5 show the classification of land area by agricultural potential. 
5.048 million hectares are suitable for producing major export crops. Tsetse fl y infestation 
limits livestock production, claiming about 7.56 million hectares (FAO Production and 
Trade Yearbook, Various issues). 
Land redistribution and appropriation reflect the political and economic history of 
Kenya. Early agricultural legislation emphasized land reforms within the settlement areas 
evacuated by departing colonial settlers. These areas form the bulk of the high-potential 
lands where export crops thrive. By 1984, an estimated 60 percent of rural people cultivated 
the high-potential lands, 30 percent cultivated the medium- to low-potential areas, and I 0 
percent cultivated the dry rangeland (FAQ Production and Trade Yearbook, Various issues). 
The high-potential areas contain the majority of commercial farms with lower 
population density than that found in the traditional areas in the Central province or in 
western Kenya. Because of increasing population pressure in the high-potential areas, land 
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Table 2.4. Growth of Kenya's GNP and agricultural productivity. and the contribution of 
agriculture to employment and export earnings 
Growth Growth Rate of Contribution of 
Rate of Agricultural Agriculture to Exports from 
GDP Production Employment Agriculture 
Year (%) (%) (%) (%) 
1965-71 7.5 6.9 88.0 57 
1972 16. l 7.7 84.8 61 
1973 5.9 4.4 84.4 63 
1974 2.1 -0.2 82.9 55 
1975 0.8 4.6 82.9 52 
1976 3.9 3.7 79.9 71 
1977 9.4 9.5 79.5 69 
1978 7.3 8.9 78.5 66 
1979 3.9 -0.3 81.0 63 
1980 4.8 0.9 77.6 49 
1981 3.9 6.1 77.1 51 
1982 1.7 11.2 76.5 57 
1983 1.5 1.6 76.0 64 
1984 3.9 -3.9 75.5 69 
1985 7.1 3.7 79. l 69 
1986 5.9 4.7 78.7 74 
1987 6.0 3.8 78.2 70 
1988 4.6 4.4 77.8 69 
1989 4.6 3.9 77.4 67 
1990 4.3 3.4 77.0 68 
1991 3.9 2.2 76.5 62 
1992 3.2 -4.8 76.1 6 1 
Source: FAD Production and Trade Yearbook, Various issues. 
fragmentation has reached an alarming level throughout the country. The situation is worse 
in the traditional areas, where lineal laws encourage land inheritances. Lineal law guarantees 
every adult male child a proportional share of the family land. Table 2 .6 shows trends in 
farm distribution in selected years. The number of farms with less than 0.5 hectares 
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increased fourfold between 1970 and 1978. Similarly, the number of farms with less than 
one hectare increased threefold. 
At least twenty-five economically important species of crops, which can be divided 
into sixty-four crop types, and six livestock types are produced in Kenya (Kassan1 et al ., 
1991 ). The main cash crops include cereal crops (maize and wheat), export crops (tea, 
coffee, sisal, and pyrethrum), industrial crops (cotton, sugar, and tobacco), and horticultural 
crops (vegetables and flowers). 
Livestock types include dairy and beef cattle, pigs, poultry, small ruminants, and 
bees. Maize and horticultural crops are widely grown as staple food crops. Export and 
industrial crops are grown in suitable ecological regions, as shown in Figure 2.3 . 
Commercial livestock production, especially dairy and highbred beef, is prevalent within the 
high rainfall areas. Local traditional beef, dairy, and small ruminant production is 
widespread in the low lands and the Savannah grassland. 
Land tenure patterns 
Agricultural production is divided into large-scale farms and small-scale farms. 
Large-scale farms are officially defined as land holdings of more than 50 hectares, while 
small -scale farms are defined as 50 hectares or less. This classification varies, depending on 
the potential of the land (above 20 hectares, or equal to and below, respectively with majority 
of small -scale commercial farms in high potential areas) . In 1973, there were 3,500 holdings 
that averaged over 800 hectares and more than 600 000 holdings that averaged less than two 
hectares (World BankAnnual Report, 1973). 
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Table 2.5 . Classification of Kenya· s land area by agricultural potential 
Classification 
High Potential 
Medium Potential 
Low Potential 
Unusable 
Total 
Land Area Percentage of 
(1 ,000 hectares) Total 
6,785 11.9 
3,157 5.5 
42,105 74.0 
4,867 8.6 
56,914 100 
Source: International Labor Organization, 1985. 
Table 2.6. Distribution of rural household farms by size, in Kenya 
1970 1978 1993 ------------------· ------------------ ----------------· 
(hectares) (%) (hectares) (%) (hectares) (%) 
Below 0.5 11.7 Below 0.5 46.8 Below 1.0 27 
0.5-0.99 15.5 0.5-0.9 20.1 1.0-2.5 29 
1.0-1.9 24.6 l.0-1.9 15.8 2.6-3.5 9 
2.0-2.9 16.4 2.0-2.9 7.3 3.6-5.0 8 
3.0-4.9 13.3 3.0-3 .9 3.2 5.1 -10.0 11 
5.0-9.9 11.3 4.0-4.9 1.6 10. 1-20.0 7 
Above 10.0 7.0 5.0-7.9 2.8 20.1-35.0 2 
Over 8.0 2.4 Over 35.0 7 
Lele and Agarwa, 1989. 
b Calculated from a sample of 1993 AFC borrowers. This column represents only the 
distribution of holdings for those borrowing from the institution. 
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The farm sector can be grouped into four main categories: large-scale commercial 
farms, small-scale commercial farms, traditional farms, and pastoral farms. Traditional and 
pastoral farms are considered subsistence farms, and agricultural practices are closely related 
to ethnic economic traits (e.g. , Bantu cultivators, Hermitic pastorals, Cultic nomads, Dorobo 
hunters, and Bujun fishermen) . 
Large-scale commercial farms are capital-intensive and rely heavily on mechanized 
operations and modem inputs. They can be mixed or specialized. Dairy, beef, and sheep 
farming are common livestock enterprises. The major crops include wheat, barley, oats, 
maize, tea, coffee, sunflower, fruits, and sugarcane. 
Small-scale commercial farms are numerous, and can be highly or moderately capitaJ-
intensive. They are labor-intensive and generally depend on oxen; only a few use 
mechanization. Farm labor consists of both family and hired workers, but hired labor is 
common during peak labor periods, such as weeding and harvesting. Very small farms 
produce labor-intensive products such as vegetables, poultry, and pyrethrum. 
Traditional farms are matrilineal and are subject to subdivision with each subsequent 
generation. They are often small in size and located in the high-potential areas, which have 
high population densities. Farm size becomes progressively larger toward the pastoral and 
arid lands. Oxen and donkey are the main forms of traction. Occasionally tractor service or 
labor is hired. These farm enterprises are diversified, but traditional staple foods are 
emphasized and any surplus is marketed in the local open markets or directly from the farm. 
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Crops include English potatoes, sweet potatoes, cassava, groundnut, rice, sorghum, millet, 
maize, pulses, and fruits . 
Traditional farm families have little incentive to change their subsistence and ethnic-
oriented lifestyles and occupations. Normally, they have a high propensity to invest in 
nonagricultural ventures (e.g., retail shops) as a way of diversifying income sources. There is 
a distinct division of labor based on gender. Men till the land and herd livestock. Women 
are more involved in producing traditional food crops. They plant, weed, harvest milk, and 
herd young stock. 
Pastoral farms are mainly communal, and shifting livestock grazing is practiced 
extensively. In most cases, these farms are matrilineal and characterized by individual stock 
ownership and communal land use. Diversified herd type and separation of herds into 
several locations is a survival strategy to guard against weather hazards. Upgrading of 
livestock by cross-breeding the local herd with exotic breeds is practiced. Pastoral livestock 
include camels, cattle, goats, and sheep. Increasing pressure on grazing land as a result of the 
commercialization of ranches, encroachment of crop cultivators, and allocation of pastoral 
land to tourist game parks has precipitated pasture degradation. 
Land control 
Farmland is traditionally a highly valued asset. The farmers tend to have strong 
ethnic laws that govern its use. The decision to obtain credit for family farms may require the 
farmer to seek authority from other family members. In high-potential settlement areas, the 
pressure to consult family is less pronounced. 
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Some pastoral areas have yet to be demarcated and are group-owned for the most part. 
A single clan may occupy di fferent, separated pieces of group farms. Credit provision on 
group-owned farms is discouraged. If credit is provided to the group, the group farm is 
usually offered as collateral, but the loan funds are split among individuals. Each group 
member contributes a specific level of funds toward group facili ti es such as cattle dips and 
watering troughs. The balance of credit is used by the indjvidual borrower for restocking and 
veterinary services. Default rates within the pastoral communities are hjgh and the 
realiz.ation of collateral is impractical. The impact of credit in group-owned farms is often 
difficult to measure because group facilities are difficult to manage and maintain beyond the 
life of the loan. 
High-potential settlement areas are owned by individuals across all ethnic groups. 
The majority of these farms are held by elite, rich farmers. Credit decisions are made 
unilaterally by the individual household. These farmers hold the highest share of the farm 
credit and dominate in the production of marketed produce such as coffee, tea, maize, and 
sugarcane. 
Producer pricing policies 
Kenya has maintained an efficient marketing system for export crops, but an 
inefficient one for food crops and livestock products (Bevan, Collier and Gunnie, 1993). For 
example, the coffee board of Kenya acts as an auctioneer for coffee producers. It sells coffee 
at world prices and charges a commission for doing so. Thus, the producer's price follows 
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world prices. Coffee producers have received as high as 90 percent of the price received by 
the marketing board. Surprisingly, the government has not been keen on taxing export 
producers. Evidently, this has been a source of motivation for export producers. 
Production of food crops, especially of maize and wheat, have faced a totally different 
situation. As Bevan, Collier and Gunning ( 1993) observed, the maize and produce marketing 
board has monopolized interdistrict marketing of these two important food crops. The 
government announces the price at which the board buys from farmers and sells to 
consumers. lntradistrict marketing, on the other hand. is somewhat free. This situation is 
similar for milk and other minor produce. Whenever the government marketing system is not 
able to handle the produce (e.g., a bumper season), the announced prices do not act as a floor 
or a ceiling for the produce in intradistrict trade. These small-scale producers experience 
large price differentials between regions. 
The critical problem with government marketing controls is the uncertainty they 
create among efficient producers. The government system often has no efficient way of 
handling produce or promptly paying producers. Farmers in surplus areas are not sure of 
when or if the board will buy their produce, and when it will pay if it does. Farmers therefore 
engage in a wide range of enterprises including off-farm businesses to protect themselves 
against marketing and price uncertainties. 
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Reform issues 
The performance of Kenya 's agricultural sector could be better. In the last two 
decades. both internal and external factors have caused the sector' s unsatisfactory 
performance. The most damaging and de-motivating fac tors to producers are the pricing 
system of agricultural inputs and products and heavy government involvement in marketing, 
especially for cash and food crops. These problems are addressed in current structural 
reforms. Beef prices were decontrolled in 1987. and the price of beef has more than tripled. 
Three key parastatals, the South Nyanza Sugar Company and the National Cereals and 
Produce Board were reorganized, and maize marketing was partially deregulated. The 
government also adopted measures that improved marketing and pricing efficiency of 
fertilizers by increasing the number of licensed importers from 15 to 20 in 1989. By 1990, 
the government had fully decontrolled fertilizer prices on the domestic market. 
Lele ( 1989) argues that increased efficiency will not lead to equitable growth if 
production factors are not distributed equitably or if farmers have unequal abi lity to 
undertake and manage risk. Risk and loss evaluation require the ability of the farmer to 
anach monetary value to all factors of production. The farmer 's time and labor are as 
important as cash, and livestock herd ' s must be viewed in terms of quality and calf turnover. 
Resources have shrunk, and production ri sks and efficiencies in production factor use are 
becoming increasingly important. 
No single initiative or policy will be sufficient to deal with Kenya 's economic 
problems. A more comprehensive policy that mutually supports all aspects of development 
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is necessary. Accompanying institutional changes that can revitalize Kenya's agricultural 
sector are important aspects in the development process. The description of Kenya's farm 
credit institutions in the fo llowing section emphasizes thi s point. 
Kenya's Agricultural Credit 
Agricultural credit has played an important role in the development of Kenya' s 
agricultural sector since independence in 1963. The oldest farm credit sources are 
commercial banks, merchant suppliers, and quasi-government agencies. Today, Kenya has 
an array of well-established credit institutions serving agriculture either through government 
directives or as government-sponsored agencies, member-owned cooperative organizations, 
and private independent lenders. 
Commercial banks account for 48 percent of total credit. AFC, the single largest 
government-sponsored specialized credit institution, accounts for 20 percent. Combined 
AFC and government for funding of the seasonal crops credit scheme (SCCS) accounted for 
14 percent of total credit to the agricultural sector until 1984 (after 1984, AFC took over 
financing of SCCS instead of operating it on commission). Other credit institutions such as 
cooperatives and non bank sources account for 18 percent of total credit to agriculture 
(Agricultural Finance Corporation of Kenya, 1992). 
At the time of independence, farmers ' credit requirements were for long-term loans 
for land purchase and capital-intensive investments such as bush clearing, removal of tree 
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stumps, fencing, and water facilities. The government had organized settlement loans that 
were relatively long term, mainly for land purchase within the settlement areas. AFC 
provided supplementary long-, medium-, and short-term loans for various agricultural uses. 
AFC later inherited the defunct Guaranteed Minimum Return (GMR) of 1942-78, a 
government-sponsored credit for large- and medium-scale maize and wheat farmers. As the 
name suggests, GMR had an insurance system that compensated natural losses. Various 
credit schemes have since been introduced by the government. In the 1970s, two Joan 
schemes were introduced: the SmaJJholder Production Services and Credit Project (SPSCP) 
and the Integrated Agricultural Development Project (IADP). The SPSCP was a precursor of 
the £ADP, financed by USAID and administered by AFC. The New Seasonal Crop Credit 
(NSCS), now referred to as SCCS, replaced the GMR, and had similar objectives of food 
sufficiency. Unlike GMR, SCCS has no insurance coverage. The Cooperative Production 
Credit (CPC), which was started in 1972, caters mainly to producers of cash crops such as 
coffee and tea. The Smallholder Coffee Improvement Project (SCIP), started in 1979, helps 
small-scale coffee farmers rehabilitate coffee plantations where quality has deteriorated. 
AFC administers a more general production credit, which supplements all credit sources. 
Besides the formal credit channels, traditional informal credit systems for rural 
communities exist. These systems include cash exchange between members of the fami ly 
and/or clan and friends involving credit in cash or kind. In-kind credit may include family 
members, friends, and church groups who assist with the field operations of weeding and 
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harvesting. Local merchants, shopkeepers, and community leaders also provide local credit 
in various forms. No records exist as to the total level of the informal credit used in Kenya. 
In recent years, AFC has dominated the long-and medium-term loan markets, and 
other institutions have tended to supply shorter-term loans. The type of credit is determined 
by the purpose of the loan. Land purchase loans. although now being phased out, carry the 
longest duration. Medium- and short-term loans are used for working capital and seasonal 
crop production. Table 2. 7 and Figure 2.4 show that large-scale farm enterprises are leading 
in borrowing. Agricultural board borrowing peaked around 1983 and dropped to the same 
levels as small-scale and cooperative enterprises by 1990. Figure 2.5 also shows AFC 
lending to small -scale, large-scale, and SCCS projects between l 980 and 1992. The largest 
amount of money lent by AFC for long- and medium-term loans is to large-scale borrowers. 
Most AFC short-term loans are used by SCCS. 
Credit allocation among the smal l-scale and large-scale sectors is shown in Table 2.8. 
Of the credit allocated in 1972, 41 percent was for small farms and 59 percent was fo r large 
farms (World Bank, 1973). The emphasis on the small farm sector put the two sectors in 
tight competition for virtually all resources and services. The distribution of loans between 
small and large farms changed dramatically by 1989; 9 1 percent of farms receiving credit 
were small , while 9 percent were large. Short-term loans claimed 50 percent of all funds 
advanced to small-scale farmers. More than 70 percent of loans to large farms were long 
term. Although small -scale farmers received the bulk of the credit, large farms benefited 
more from the credit because they held much larger average loan sizes. The AFC average 
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Table 2.7. Distribution of outstanding commercial bank agricultural loans in Kenya, by type 
of borrower 
Value of Loans (million Ksh.) 
Small- Large Agricultural-
Year scale a Scaleb Cooperatives Boardsc Total 
1974 103.80 235.30 62.80 54.70 456.60 
1975 167.00 363.30 94.20 88.70 713.20 
1976 243.50 432.20 85 .30 152.10 913.10 
1977 307.50 517.40 197.90 330.10 1,352.90 
1978 302.50 732.50 353 .90 174.30 1,563.20 
1979 3 17.50 986.00 399.00 161.70 1.864.20 
1980 380.30 1,053.70 432.30 211.90 2,078.20 
1981 499.70 1,008.90 462.40 335.40 2,306.40 
1982 559.20 1,151.10 436. l 0 674.90 2,821 .30 
1983 594.30 1,2 10.00 592.80 1,414.80 3,811.90 
1984 700.60 1,268.30 654.50 1,013.10 3,636.50 
1985 805 .00 1,676.60 603.90 1,253.20 4,338.70 
1986 922.90 1,787.70 595.20 1,270.40 4,576.20 
1987 940.00 1,881.70 1,204.90 949.80 4,976.40 
1988 1,080.90 2,677.] 0 1,321.90 1,098.70 6,178.60 
1989 1,072.00 3,237.90 1,384.20 1,075 .50 6,769.60 
1990 1,178.80 3,041 .50 1,246.70 1,368.00 6,835.00 
Source: Central Bank of Kenya, 1990. 
a Small-scale farm enterprises include individual farms groups (not cooperative societies), 
and companies 
with farms of less than 50 hectares. 
b Large-scale farm enterprises include individuals farmers, groups of farmers (not 
cooperative societies), and companies with farms of more than 50 hectares. 
c Agricultural Boards include such statutory institutions as the Agricultural Development 
Corporation (ADC), Pyrethrum Marketing Board, Kenya Tea Development Authority 
(KTDA). Cotton Lint and Marketing Board, National Jrrigation Board, and Lands Limited. 
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Table 2.8. Estimated agricultural credit provided to the small-scale and large-scale farm 
subsectors 
Total Credit to Total Credit to 
Fiscal Small Farms Large Farms 
Year (%) (%) 
1972173 41 59 
1980/81 36 64 
1981 /82 62 38 
1982/83 45 55 
1983/84 63 37 
1984/85 72 28 
1985/86 91 9 
Calculated by author from World Bank, 1973, and Kenya Bureau of Statistics, 1990. 
loan size for large-scale farmers was eight times that for small farms in 1980 and three times 
that for small farms by 1992. 
Realizing the increasingly competing credit needs of Kenya 's small and large farm 
sectors, the government instituted several measures aimed at expanding credit to small-scale 
farmers. Currently, commercial banks are required to lend at least 17 percent of their net 
deposits to agricultural enterprises, and nonbank financial institutions are required to lend at 
least 10 percent. Although the requirement does not specify the allocation of the credit 
between small and large farms, it forces institutions to meet a certain percentage credit 
requirement. 
In 1991 , interest rates for commercial banks and nonbank institutions were 
decontrolled for virtually all loans to encourage these institutions to lend at competitive rates 
determined by the market. The government also made amendments regarding SCCS by 
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making AFC the principal lender beginning in 1985. For AFC, no interest rate decontrols 
were effected. The implication of these changes was an influx of borrowers demanding 
AFC's relatively inexpensive credit. Strengthening financial support of existing marketing 
boards to improve short-term credit to producers has also been part of the government's 
credit strategies. 
The Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) 
AFC is the credit agency for agricultural development within Kenya's Ministry or 
Agriculture. AFC was established under Kenya's Agricultural Credit Act of 1963. Under the 
AFC Act of 1969, AFC was reconstituted and empowered to become the primary agricultural 
credit institution in Kenya. AFC took over the Land and Agricultural Bank and the GMR 
loan scheme, which had been established to serve the colonial. AFC it is thus a specialized, 
nondepository institution, and is exempted from the Companies Act and the Banking Act. 
The data for 1980 through 1992 and information used for the analysis of AFC 
operations and performance was obtained from AFC management on ( 1) the loan procedures 
manual, (2) the number and value of direct loans, by type, to farmers and staff. (3) statement 
of sources and uses of funds. (4) balance sheet statements, (5) profit and loss account 
statements, (6) operating costs, (7) reports on interest rates AFC is charged by donors and the 
government, and the interest rates AFC charges borrowers, and (8) reports on loan arrears 
and loan repayment, by loan type. The analysis of AFC operations. objectives. and 
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performance is intended to provide a historical background on how AFC has evolved to be 
Kenya's main agricu ltural lender. Areas of difficulties in AFC operations are analyzed in 
order to trace root sources of loan losses. AFC is aware of its increasing exposure to default 
ri sk; however, measures introduced in the past to mitigate loan losses have achieved little 
success. 
Policy objectives and organizational structure 
Historically, AFC was established to assist in implementing agricultural development 
policies by providing credit and farm services. Under the AFC Act of J 969, the objective of 
AFC is defined as assisting in the development of agriculture and agricul tural industries by 
making loans to farmers, cooperative societies, incorporated group representatives, private 
companies and public bodies, local authorities, and other persons engaged in agriculture or 
agricultural industries. 
AFC headquarters are in Nairobi, Kenya' s capital city. AFC has two regional offices, 
in western Kenya and eastern Kenya, 49 branches, five sub-branches, and 1,770 staff 
members (Agricultural Finance Corporation of Kenya, 1992). The administration consists of 
nine board members, a managing director, and the managing director' s staff. The board is 
appointed by the Head of State, to act as the AFC representative within the framework of 
laws established by the state. The board is therefore the policymaking body of AFC. 
The region, area, and branch office locations fo llow district administrative 
boundaries. The branch office is the lowest administrative unit of AFC. At this level, AFC 
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staff carry out loan activities within a specified area and have direct contact with borrowers. 
Each branch office is directed by an area manager, who is in tum directed by a regional 
manager. 
Sources of loanable funds 
The bulk of AFC funding comes from external loans and grants and government 
loans. Part of the funds are obtained from AFC's own accumulated general reserves and 
revolving funds. Tables 2 .9 and 2. 10 show AFC capital inflow and outstanding moneys 
owed to government and other donors. Usually, the funds are soft loans or grants extended to 
the Kenyan government from international agencies. Grants normally provide development 
assistance to rural communities. In 1989, AFC owed the government Ksh. 245.2 million, 
which represented 88 percent of AFC capital. 
Credit terms and procedures 
AFC' s primary economic function is to supply reliable low-cost credit to small-scale 
farrners. The liberal branching of AFC into rural areas is a deliberate attempt to provide rural 
communities with access to AFC loans. Farmers in certain parts of the country have not 
perceived their farms as business entities. AFC officials are thus expected to make such 
farmers aware of the services AFC offers and how the farmers could use the services for 
commercial farming. 
AFC loans are broadly classified as the AFC Principal Scheme (AFCPS) for general 
development and farm production loans and SCCS loans for maize and wheat production. 
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Table 2.9. Funds to AFC from external sources. 1980-92 (million Ksh.) 
Seasonal 
Crop 
Credit Irredeemable Redeemable 
Year Scheme Grants Loans Loans 
1980 0.0 41.20 0.15 I 08.51 
1981 0.0 1.21 0.21 63.63 
1982 0.0 0.64 3.21 58.69 
1983 0.0 0.83 0.0 8.00 
1984 0.0 8.83 0.0 84.66 
1985 60.0 13 .10 0.0 250.41 
1986 0.0 14.87 0.0 235.14 
1987 0.0 1.26 0.0 52.66 
1988 0.0 0.0 0.0 43.10 
1989 0.0 0.0 0.0 56.00 
1990 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1991 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1992 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Source: AFC audited annual reports, various years. 
Note: 0.0 means that AFC did not obtain any external funds during the year. The major 
funds under redeemable loans are for the Rural Service Design Project (Credit VI), started in 
1987. 
Table 2.10. AFC debt to the Kenyan government as of June 1993 
Source of Funds Million Ksh. 
lrredeemable Interest Loans (Government of Kenya) 
Redeemable Loans (Government of Kenya) 
GMR/SCCS Loans (CSFC) 
Irredeemable Loans (External Donors) 
Redeemable Loans (External Donors) 
Total 
Source: AFC special report on restructuring, 1993. 
8.0 
32.4 
108.6 
20.4 
75.8 
245.2 
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FCPS is further classified into two major categories by loan size: large-scale loans between 
Ksh. 50,001 and Ksh. 2 million, and small-scale loans that are typically below Ksh. 50,000. 
The loans are also sub-categorized by loan duration: short term (less than three years), 
medium term (three years to less than seven years), and long term (seven years to thirty 
years). 
AFC interest rates are set periodically by the govenunent. Although AFC interest 
rates vary by loan scheme, they are always below market rates. These lower rates make AFC 
the least-cost formal agricultural lender, which makes AFC loan demand remain far above 
what it can supply. For AFCPS, interest rates are adjusted about once a decade. SCCS 
interest rates are adjusted as frequently as every two to three years. Table 2.11 shows AFC 
interest rates for the period 1980-92. Because most AFC loans are long term, increasing 
inflation rates translate into negative real interest rates, which also encourage use of credit. 
The AFC system of assessing loan eligibility is based on internal appraisal reports on 
a proposed project. The farmer 's financial and operating information is analyzed by an AFC 
loan officer to ascertain the applicant' s repayment ability. The traditional five credit factors 
are usually applied: character, financial condition, equity contribution, repayment capacity, 
and collateral position. The AFC loan assessment philosophy is stated in the 1987 
operational manual : "A loan is collected at the time of making it." This philosophy implies 
that it is more important to accurately predict the borrower's repayment ability at the time of 
loan making than to correct mistakes later. The ability of a loan officer to make an accurate 
loan decision depends on well he or she knows the ability and the willingness of the borrower 
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to repay debts. AFC stresses equitable treatment of borrowers in loan assessment to maintain 
borrower loyalty and confidence in the corporation. 
Generally, AFC loans have two to sixteen special condition provision in the loan 
agreement, depending on the loan purpose. For example, small ruminant Joans have two 
Table 2. 11 . AFC interest rates for borrowing and lending, by Joan type, and inflation rates, 
1980-92 
Interest Interest Interest 
Average3 Ratesb at Rates Rates Interest 
Interest which AFC AFC Rates 
Rates at AFC Charges Charges AFC 
which Lends for for Charges 
AFC to Inflation Development Working for 
Year Borrows Farmers Rates Loans Capital sccsc 
1980 3.4 10.3 11.3 10.0 10 11.0 
198 1 3.2 12.3 24.8 12.0 13 12.0 
1982 3.4 13.0 18.3 12.0 13 14.0 
1983 3.7 13.0 10.1 12.0 13 14.0 
1984 4 .0 13.0 11.1 12.0 13 14.0 
1985 3.9 13.0 11.4 12.0 13 14.0 
1986 6.0 13.0 5.6 12.0 13 14.0 
1987 8.2 13 .0 7.6 12.0 13 14.0 
1988 7.6 13.0 10.7 12.0 13 14.0 
1989 7.6 13.0 15.6 12.0 13 14.0 
1990 7.7 13.0 19.8 12.0 13 14.0 
1991 7.8 14.0 27.0 12.0 13 14.0 
1992 8.1 14.0 24.0 12.0 13 17.0 
Source: Agricultural Finance Corporation of Kenya, 1993. 
a Interest rates at which AFC obtains credit from the government. 
b Average interest rates at which AFC lends to farmers. The interest rates for lending then 
vary within the schemes. Working capital loans are revolving loan funds repayable within 
one to three years. 
c Seasonal crop credit scheme. 
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stated conditions, dairy loans have six, bore-hole loans (drilling of water wells) have five, 
permanent crops have eight, farmhouses have thirteen, and lifting of bank mortgages 
(refinancing of bank Joans) have sixteen. Fulfillment of these conditions may be required as 
early as loan approval time or as disbursements are in progress. 
In 1986, AFC decentralized certain procedures to improve the accountabil ity and 
effici ency of its officers. Among the changes was the loan approval authorization level. 
AFC now has four levels of loan approval depending on the type of Joan scheme. Table 2.1 2 
shows these authorization levels. 
Table 2. 12. AFC loan authorization level 
Authorizing 
Officer 
Branch Manager 
AFC 
Principal Schemes 
(Ksh.) 
Under 50,000 
Seasonal Crop 
Credit scheme 
(Ksh.) 
Under 250,000 
Regional Manager Over 50,000 up to I 00,000 Over 250,000 up to 500,000 
Managing Director Over 100,000 up to 200,000 Over 500,000 
AFC Board 
Source: AFC Operational Manual, 1987. 
To ratify in the next board 
meeting all loans over 500,000 
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Loan di sbursement authority is shared among the branch manager, regional manager, 
and managing director. As shown in Table 2.12, the branch manager authorizes loan 
payments below Ksh. 50,000 for any principal loan scheme, and the managing director 
authorizes amounts above Ksh. 100,000. AFC loans are, in most cases, disbursed in kind. 
Once the loan is approved, the borrower obtains a letter of authority to incur expenditure 
(AIE). The A1E is presented to the supplier of loan items, who issues an invoice to AFC 
against the borrower's account. Theoretically, the borrower should obtain the items as soon 
as the invoice is drawn, but in practice, the supplier may wait until the invoice is paid by 
AFC before releasing the items to the farmer. Most suppliers hold the view that the AFC 
payment process is slow. They are not wi lling to supply as expected due to inventory and 
financial implications. 
To solve this problem, in 1987 the World Bank initiated the Rural Service Design 
Project (RSDP) (namely, Credit IV under the Smallholder Lending Program), to strengthen 
the AFC credit deli very system. In 1990 and 1991 , two sets of evaluations assessed the 
performance of participating branches. Determining efficiency of lending through speedy 
loan processing was one objective of the evaluations. It was reported that it took AFC 102 
days and 105 days in 1990 and 1991, respectively, to process loans from the date the 
application is purchased by the farmer to the date the first loan disbursement draft is released. 
Reasons for the delays included the time taken by the borrower to (l ) register collateral. (2) 
fulfill special loan conditions (the more special conditions a borrower has to fulfill , the longer 
it takes to complete a credit transaction), and (3) present invoices for processing. 
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The second set of performance evaluations, started in 1988, showed marked 
improvements in credit management practices, particularly Joan documentation and 
disbursement. According to the evaluation report, misapplication of Joan funds was still a 
major concern and was not limited to Credit IV Joans. Under the Credit IV scheme, however, 
a number of branches promptly recalled misapplied funds. By 1990, Credit IV total arrears 
was 8.4 percent of a total portfolio of Ksh. 109. 7 million, financing 3,418 borrowers. The 
collection rate on Credit IV loans was 69.5 percent (Agricultural Finance Corporation of 
Kenya, 1990). 
Loan servicing procedures 
AFC's primary objective in servicing loans is to ensure proper Joan utilization and to 
reduce the risk of default. Servicing activities include assisting borrowers in the initial 
planning of the loan project and disseminating technical knowledge pertaining to the project 
throughout the life of the loan. Farmer/AFC contact mainly occurs through farm/office visits 
and letters and occasionally by telephone. Servicing is critical during loan disbursements 
when compliance with certain conditions is closely monitored and to ensure that loan funds 
are not diverted to other uses. When loan funds are diverted to other uses and the diversion is 
minor, the borrower is warned, or given a chance to rectify the problem using his/her funds . 
For more serious cases the unspent loan balance is frozen and the loan is immediately 
recalled through foreclosure action. 
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Post-disbursement loan servicing is a systematic follow-up to keep AFC abreast of 
the borrower' s farm activities and to help identify problems. During this period, the 
borrower normally of makes installment payments, which form part of the post-disbursement 
loan service activity. 
Loan disbursement and servicing procedures have not effectively reduced the problem 
of unauthorized use of credit funds . For the most part, delaying the release of loan funds 
creates a number of problems that facilitate unintended use. First, farmers may change their 
planned activities to guard against losses that would result from delayed projects. These 
changes may not be relevant to agriculture. Second the farmer may not want to turn down 
funds, especially after incurring the costs of obtaining the funds. Third, the credit institution 
weakens its own ability to be thorough in loan servicing and to prevent unauthorized use of 
funds when loan funds are delayed. 
Loan collection procedures 
AFC loans normally have a grace period of one year. Farmers may make installment 
payments as they wish during the grace period and earn 5 percent interest on their credit 
balances. Installment payments can be made directly to any AFC office or by signing a 
banker's order (periodic remittances from the bank account), salary order, or produce 
marketing agency order. The borrower' s relatives may make similar remittance on behalf of 
the borrower. 
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pecial fann visits are carried out for loan collections. especially for defaulting and 
delinquent borrowers. Because one loan officer may supervise more than 300 borrowers, 
farm visits are mai nly to defaulting borrowers. Reasons for default are often difficult to 
verify, even at the farm level, because of the Jack of farm records. When a genuine reason is 
identified (for example, a widespread drought), AFC may seek government authority to 
reschedule the loans of affected borrowers. Occasionally the government will direct AFC to 
write off bad debts. On an individual level, AFC may reschedule and/or provide additional 
loans. The most drastic action for defaults on unforgivable Joans is foreclosure. AFC has 
accumulated many farm properties from foreclosure. 
AFC Performance Between 1980 and 1992 
Three measures of perfonnance are used to determine whether AFC channels funds to 
small-scale farmers at reasonable cost within the constraints of quality loans. These 
measures are efficiency, equity and financial viability. Although AFC is not a profit 
maximizing entity, it is expected to progress towards self-reliance and reduce dependency on 
public funds. AFC is also expected to maximize the absolute number of small-scale farmers 
it lends to as well as loan the amount outstanding. Otherwise, it would be construed that 
AFC is diverting benefits of low-cost credit away from farmers and thus limiting government 
intentions for subsidized credit. A healthy perfonnance in tenns of efficiency in costs, equity 
and financial viabi lity is a demonstration of success in meeting the credit needs of the target 
group. 
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The financial structure of AFC 
The financial structure of AFC is shown in Table 2.13. In 1980, AFC had an equity 
base of Ksh. 1l9.63 million, which expanded to Ksh. 502.61 million by 1986, and then 
declined to Ksh. 340 by 1992. On the other hand, net total assets rose almost three fold from 
Ksh. 35 million to Ksh. 83 million, between 1980 to 1992. Equity to net asset ratio 
fluctuated between a low of 9 percent and a high of 19 percent. 
Table 2.13. AFC financial structure, 1980-92 
Net Total Equity to 
Equity Assets Net Asset 
Year (million K£.)3 (million K£.)3 Ratio(%) 
1980 5.04 34.75 14 
1981 5.48 37.34 15 
1982 5.66 41.08 14 
1983 6.04 41.49 15 
1984 7.22 40.56 18 
1985 8.81 47.72 18 
1986 10.96 57.91 19 
1987 12.3 1 79.91 16 
1988 13.68 80.78 17 
1989 7.95 92.36 9 
1990 9.05 83.49 1 I 
1991 9.41 80.55 12 
1992 10.42 82.93 13 
Source: Calculated by author from AFC annual reports. various years. 
a I K£= Ksh. 20. 
0 
0 
0 
~ 
"' ~
420000 
0 
0 
0 
370000 
320000 
270000 
220000 
170000 
120000 
70000 
x 
""""--~~---l~---i-i·~---'-----....... --~~~~~--~----~~,..._----~,......i!J----.....11----~ 20000 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Years -x- Large scale -0-Small scale X Ranch o secs 
Figure 2.6. AFC loan portfo lio by loan type, 1980-93 
0\ 
~ 
25000 
15000 
II) .... 
~ 
~ "' 0 VI t: 
0 co 
10000 
x 
5000 
x 
~~_.-ll 
~ ~ ~-(5 x i5 i5 l:i a a ~ a a 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Year -x- large scale -6- small scale o Ranch x SCCS -o- Total 
Figure 2. 7. New AFC borrowers by loan type, 1980-90 
66 
Loan portfolio and number of borrowers 
AFC loan portfolio was about Ksh. 36 million in 1980, and by 1992. it was about 
Ksh. I 00 million (Figure 2.6 obtained from data in appendix 3.2). Over the thirteen-year 
span, AFC total loan volume of AFC-approved loans nearly tripled, from about Ksh. 156 
million to Ksh. 499 million financing about 132 thousand borrowers (Figure 2. 7). Large-
scaJe farm loans accounted for 4 percent, small-scale loans were 27 percent. ranch were less 
than I percent, and SCCS, which began in 1981 , was 68 percent. In 1982 and 1983 SCCS 
held the highest loans on a per year basis for the entire period. By 1992, SCCS had reduced 
by 21 fold from its peak in 1982. Combined AFC loans had the smallest share of 38 percent. 
The amount of money involved was Ksh.6.76 million. Large scale loans were 28 percent, 
small-scale loans were 17 percent, ranch were 6 percent and SCCS 49 percent. Large scale 
loans were allocated twice as much money as were the small-scale loans. 
The AFC loan portfolio has been declining for development loans because foreign 
donors drastically reduced loans and grants contribution. Credit IV, which was initiated in 
1987 was the last reasonable loanable funds amount obtained from the World Bank. Nor has 
the government provided new capital to AFC on a consistent manner. AFC' s internally 
generated funds form the main source for financing operations. Without injection of external 
funds, AFC lending capacity to provide term loans has reduced drastically. AFC has been 
heavily engaged in SCCS for the past eight years, creating competition between term loans 
and seasonal loans. Loans to staff members also claimed part of the loanable funds. 
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The average loan amount per loan scheme grew rapidly over the entire period, about 6 
fo ld. Average loans for ranching were more inconsistent than large and small-scale loans. 
The most consistent were the small-scale loans. Average large scale loans increased 17 fold 
while average small-scale loans increased about 3 fold. 
Loan repayment performance 
Loan repayment for the period 1980-1992 is shown in Table 2. 14. Total collection 
was Ksh. 6.4 million of which large scale loans were 31 percent, small-scale loans were 15 
percent, ranch were 9 percent, and SCCS was 49 percent. AFC collected just about what it 
disbursed. The highest collection as a percentage of disbursement was from large scale loans 
while ranch and SCCS performed poorest. 
During the period under review AFC provided an amount equal to Ksh 77.4 million in 
bad and doubtful debts. Large scale and ranch loans combined held 80 percent, small-scale 
loans had 14 percent, and SCCS 6 percent. From the relative levels of allocation of bad and 
doubtful debts, AFC obviously expects highest default from the large scale loans, as shown 
in the provisions for bad debt in Table 2.1 4. This situation is evident from the arrears growth 
rate for the period as shown in Figure 2.9. 
Operational costs 
Loan administration costs have been increasing. The costs grew by 1.5 percent from 
4. 7 percent in 1984 to 6.2 percent in 1990 (AFC, 1993). Growth in costs follow the overall 
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Table 2.14 Provision for bad and doubtful debts by loan type (Ksh): 1980-92 
Year Large scale Small-scale SCCS 
1980 1,877,540 478,515 NA 
1981 1,949,956 603,375 NA 
1982 2,983,884 548,202 NA 
1983 3,452, 164 529,763 NA 
1984 3,609,054 668.272 NA 
1985 3,915 039 711,435 NA 
1986 4,303,660 990,629 451 ,829 
1987 5,625,441 400,636 16,854 
1988 6, 188,730 720,761 255,048 
1989 11,518,520 1, 198, 168 339.921 
1990 5,003,850 1,315,924 982,699 
1991 5,547,218 1,395,020 1,023,925 
1992 5,748,397 1,583,424 1,502,079 
NA = Not available 
Note: Although no data was avajJable to the author under SCCS between 1980-1985, the 
scheme was existing. 
Source: AFC annual reports, various years 
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economic trends. Increases in inflation resulted in higher expenses for fuel, repairs, and 
equipment. Cost of loan administration vary with branches. 
Trends in AFC staff and administrative costs are shown in Figure 2.10. The staff 
costs rose rapidly from 1986 onwards, with increase in salaries accounting for a big portion. 
This was in line with a series of salary review recommendations in the government sector. 
The general administrative costs have remained relatively modest over the entire period. 
Another reason for the rise in staff costs was due to the hiring of branch accountants. AFC 
did not, however, improve much in terms of loan collection as more staff were required in 
handling seasonal crop credit loans that continued to be popular among borrowers. The ratio 
of staff cost to administrative cost also increased as shown in the first portion of figure 2.4. 
The weighted cost of funds for AFC is estimated at 7 .14 percent while the weighted 
lending rates was about 11 .84 percent. This provides AFC with a spread of 4.6 percent. The 
cost of funds for the major schemes, Credit JV at 8 percent, R.S.D.P at 7.6 percent, SCCS at 
14 percent, and Livestock II at 3 percent. Credit JV and R.S.D.P. combined provide a spread 
of 4 % while SCCS does not provide any. 
The average cost of AFC operations between 1984 and 1990 was 13 .34 percent (7 .14 
percent cost of funds plus 6.2 percent cost of loan administration). Ignoring the cost of direct 
losses from default and considering only interest charges, AFC operates at a loss of 1.5 
percent. 
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Operational difficulties 
AFC faces considerable difficulties in its abi lity to supervise borrowers. The seasonal 
demand for SCCS loan administration has drastically reduced time devoted for supervision of 
term loans. The critical factor is the cost implication for SCCS, especially when it does not 
Figure 2.10 AFC operational costs 
provide any interest spread. Inadequate supervision thus results in default and loan diversion. 
The AFC system of penalty on default does not include default on interest charges. This 
system gives borrowers incentive to default because interest arrears are essentially interest 
free loans. 
Viability issues related to default are central to AFC. Default sources include 
drought, inadequate loan supervision and collection system, and political interference in 
collection enforcement. Nyanza and Western Kenya, disposal of collateral is difficult due to 
the structural set up of the farrn communities and culture related problems. 
AFC restructuring proposals 
In 1986, AFC was granted approval by the government to undertake financial 
restructuring that would transform it into an agricultural bank. The restructuring objectives 
were to remove uncollectable loans from the accounting system and to expand the eroded 
capital base. Maintaining uncollectable accounts on computer memory was costly yet no 
returns were expected. The plan approved a loan write-off totaling Ksh.817 .3 million (59 
percent seasonal crop credit in old GMR, 15 percent seasonal crop credit under the new 
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SCCS, 15 percent in ranch Joans, and 11 percent in miscellaneous loans). Another write-off 
of Ksh. 77.4 million was composed of 80 percent large scale and ranch loans. 14 percent 
small-scale and 0.6 percent SCCS. The eroded capital base was 12 percent of total net assets 
financed by AFC own capital funds and 88 percent financed by loan capital. AFC's total 
debt then was Ksh. 2,452 million (6 1 percent domestic debt and 39 percent external). The 
proposal was to bring equity to debt ratio to 1.25 (Ksh. 777 million long term debts and Ksh. 
884 million in equity). 
AFC complained of the serious cost problems it faces by not charging a penalty on 
interest overdue. AFC penalty is based on principal overdue. Restructuring policies would 
allow AFC to charge penalty on total outstanding arrears to discourage defaulters who 
deliberately avoid repaying interest due simply because it is an interest free loan. It was felt 
that the relatively low interest rates charged by AFC were creating a huge demand for loans. 
The demand always outweighed supply. The plan recommended a market harmonized 
interest rate policy. 
The income tax liability on AFC books, worth Ksh. 6.6 million as of 1986, was 
believed to be erroneous since it was based on non-performing loans and an under estimation 
of bad and doubtful debts. AFC desired that this amount to be waived so fresh calculation 
could begin based on better accounting records. 
Funding for the restructured AFC was estimated at Ksh. 534.9 million. The 
disbursement of the funds was proposed to be over a period of four years based on five years 
after AFC restructured. These disbursements proposals excluded the proposed new capital 
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structure. The new capital structure was concerned with the outstanding reserve deficit on 
SCCS prior to 1985 of Ksh. 4.8 million and AFC surplus reserves of 1.4 million. The 
combined deficits and the surplus was a net deficit of 46.6 million. AFC requested that these 
funds be charged against the capital funds and be treated separately from the estimated new 
capital requests. 
Also of importance were measures that would boost credit to agriculture. AFC 
suggested three main redistribution mechanisms of capital to the sector. These were: (1) 
rediscounting a certain percentage of agricultural lender' s portfolio to encourage more 
institutions to participate in agricultural lending (2) administering the 17 percent net deposit 
requirement of the Central Bank of Kenya to agricultural lending by commercial banks that 
could be delegated to AFC on an agency basis and (3) establishing an agricultural credit 
coordinating council to formulate resource mobilizing strategies in the agricultural credit 
markets and prioritizing and coordinating supply of agricultural credit. 
Conclusion 
Evidently AFC is conscious of its operational difficulties in credit intermediation. As 
Braverman and Guasch (1993) pointed out. government-sponsored credit institutions face 
annual peak-load demand for speedy credit decisions and disbursement, always have to work 
with inflexible repayment schedule policies, for example, loan repayments are matched w ith 
harvest season which is in itself another peak-load speedy loan collection and so on. The key 
issue that AFC need to address is how the borrowers use such weaknesses, especially in 
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relation to credit policies and operational inefficiencies. AFC can improve its loan decisions 
by improving loan assessment techniques. This is an area that can improve credit delivery 
and stabi lize AFC's position in coordinating credit activities and use. and repayment 
performance. In the next chapter, a closer look at literature on conceptual framework of 
credit markets is presented. The chapter also reviews literature on factors that influence loan 
repayment. 
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CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter develops a conceptual framework for loan default analysis. In the first 
section, literature review on asymmetric information problems intrinsic in credit markets is 
presented. The last part of the section discusses the concept of incentives and institutional 
credit. The second section of the chapter is a review of literature from bankruptcy and loan 
repayment prediction studies focusing on factors that determine institutional viabi li ty and 
loan repayment. 
Credit as a Market Good 
Credit and debt creation is perhaps the oldest and most complex system of reciprocity 
and cooperation in society. The lender is willing to give up consumption in the present in 
exchange for consumption in the future with a compensation and vice versa for the borrower. 
The process for creating debt contract raises a basic question with every transaction. The 
mechanisms which ensure that the debtor will meet future repayment obligations are at the 
core of the relationship. In principle, a borrower has a strong incentive to avoid repaying 
after receiving credit. The analysis of debt relationships is relatively simple under two 
conditions. First, if the debtor is viewed purely on the basis of the capacity of borrower' s 
business to generate adequate revenues and the expected revenues are known with certainty. 
Secondly, if the lender is guaranteed complete enforceability to penalize and restrict 
dishonest borrowers. However, a problem arises when lenders and borrowers are uncertain 
about the future . Normally, a lender will accept a small level of default probability in 
77 
exchange for higher compensation. The lender's concern in credit analysis is the authenticity 
of the implicit and explicit promises of the borrower associated with future debt repayment. 
The intangible nature of "trust" is often an inherent problem. 
Information Problems in Credit Markets 
Infonnation related problems in credit markets have attracted the attention of many 
researchers. Institutional arrangements such as specialized credit markets are traditionally 
seen as devices to remedy inefficiency in credit allocation and equity problems associated 
with infonnational problems. Institutional economists, such as Holdgman ( 1960). Stiglitz 
and Weiss ( 1981 ) , and Stiglitz ( 1985), argue that specialized credit institutions may easily 
create new market information problems. They may lower the cost of illiquidity and increase 
debt repayment problems. Private investors are then encouraged to take on higher risks. 
The results of these studies have made important advances in understanding the 
conceptual framework of specialized rural credit markets. These credit markets represent the 
government's response to market failure. Markets created by government directed at 
situations where a market has fai led to emerge due to infonnation problems may produce 
undesirable new outcomes. The outcomes are different from those where a market sprung up 
naturally with complete infonnation and operates competitively. Allocation of resources in 
competitive markets are believed to be efficient because the market outcomes are price 
detennined thus providing a natural starting point for gathering infonnation. Competitive 
prices are essential in determining how market participants evaluate risk as they allocate 
78 
resources. In contrast, government created markets offer inadequate information and 
resource allocation which is not price determined, thus creating sub-optimal allocation of 
resources. 
Studies foc using on failures in government sponsored credit markets in LDCs 
emphasize problems related to information. Other major failure problems include transaction 
cost, enforceability of credit contracts and the design of credit institutions (Akerlof, 1970; 
Rothschild and Stigliz, 1976; Adam and Yon Pischke, 1980; Adam and Yon Pischke, 1984; 
Braverman and Guasch, 1989; Innes, 1990: Hoff et al.. 1993 ; and Hoff and Stiglitz, 1993). 
Government specialized credit institutions provide credit at below market interest rates. This 
leads to higher demand for credit than its suppl y. When interest rates do not equilibrate 
credit supply and demand in one market, the various credit markets in the rural sector may be 
segmented geographically. The supply in all markets will also differ with interest rates, 
default risk, an event (for example a natural disaster), credit supplier, and demand and supply 
of credit in the locality. Limited information encourages formal lenders to lend in areas 
where farmers have collateral. 
mall farm borrowers · Jack of access to formal credit markets is attributed to 
asymmetric information (Adam and Yon Pischke, 1993; Hoff and Stiglitz, I 993; and Hoff et 
al. 1993). These studies have contended that lenders have imperfect in fo rmation about the 
hidden characteristics and actions of borrowers. They argue that the economic incentives of 
rural credit markets depart from the perfect information and complete market assumptions of 
the traditional competitive neoclassical models. Credit markets lack information about actual 
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economies of other markets involved, especially risk factors. Cost of information regarding 
default risk are prohibitive. Thus their transactions are often based on more than price. 
Rural credit markets also face high transaction and enforcement costs which are 
fundamental to profitability and viability. Together, these costs may el iminate some markets 
or make them incomplete and inefficient. 
Loan default risk is linked to hidden characteristics and actions which differ among 
borrowers. Default risk can be reduced by screening borrowers according to default signals 
of their characteristi cs and actions. Borrowers on the other hand may not be willing to 
provide lenders with such information, especially those who believe that a disclosure of such 
information may lower their chances of obtainjng a loan. 
Response to information problems 
It can be argued that high risk borrowers should be charged higher interest rates to 
compensate lenders for default risk. Accordingly, low risk borrowers should enjoy lower 
interest rates. But starting from the idea that asymmetric information lump heterogeneous 
prospective borrowers together, lenders encounter a problem in separating high and low risk 
customers . Again, applying high interest rates to all customers discourages low risk 
customers and encourages high risk ones. Lenders therefore respond to information 
problems either directly or indirectly in a way that attempts to balance all risk types. Credit 
rationing is a direct approach whereby lenders use risk signals to screen applicants. 
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Credi1 ralioning 
Credit ration ing is a condition of credit market in which the supply and demand of 
loan funds are not in equilibrium at the existing contract terms (Stiglitz and Weiss. 1981 ). 
Holdgman ( 1960), the first to focus on loan default as a reason fo r credit rationing, ruled out 
the argument that default alone can be a sufficient condition for credit rationing. He reasoned 
that lenders and borrowers share information and therefore have the same information about 
the future. Default risk alone cannot therefore eliminate a lender·s incentive to raise prices 
whenever credit supply is less than demand. 
Non-price rationing, a common fea ture in credit markets, results in allocation of credit 
in equilibrium with non-clearing market interest rates (Braverman and Guasch. 1991 ). Cred it 
rationing can be viewed from two perspectives: borrowers· self-imposed limits to credit use 
(internal rationing) and lender imposed credit limits on borrowers (external rationing) 
(Penson and Lin, 1980). Borrowers' credit decisions are based on the ability of a project to 
service the debt; they estimate the expected gross returns. A high variation of incomes from 
the project may suggest inability of the project to repay the debt. In this case a borrower 
reduces or terminates use of credit. Risk-neutral borrowers wi ll propose projects wi th 
positive net returns, taking into account risk provision (Hoff and Stiglitz. 1993). From a 
lender's perspective, when interest rates persistently stay below the market rates, resulting in 
a situation in which credit supply is below demand, non-price cred it rationing is an 
appropriate a llocation strategy. Lenders often use a combination of profitability 
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measurements to gauge the ability of a project to repay. Interest rates are used to indirectly 
screen proposed projects for their risk level. 
Lenders use interest rates as a screening mechanism. For every project with the same 
mean gross return but differing risk, the interest rate will determine a marginal project. 
Projects that barely provide a positive expected net return are classified as marginal and those 
which provide higher expected net return are classified as high default risk. As the interest 
rate increases, the mix of projects will also increase in risk. In an earlier study, Stiglitz and 
Weiss (198 1) argued that interest rates have a dual function. If their increase does not affect 
the risk composition of the lenders' portfolio, then lenders enjoy increased income. 
However, if they do increase the risk, lenders will ration credit. In a U .S based study 
conducted by Weerawardane (1993), internal credit rationing exceeded external credit 
rationing during unstable economic conditions for U .S farm operators. 
Information problems often oblige lenders to rely on collateral and other special loan 
conditions to ration credit. This is a way of reducing the cost of gathering information 
regarding default risk. Small farmers who do not possess collateral and fail to fulfill certain 
special conditions are excluded from the credit market. 
Signaling and screening 
Lack of direct and inexpensive ways to obtain information necessary for assessing 
borrowers ability and willingness to repay debt encourages lenders to develop indirect 
methods to screen credit-worthy borrowers. Often borrowers exhibit certain indicators or 
signals which distinguish their hidden characteristics and actions. For example, lenders may 
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infer the honesty of a borrower from leadership responsibilities and the number of 
dependents may be used to approximate family expenses. 
The problem that arises is the identification of the "best'. signal to approximate a 
particular information. Suppose that the lender is interested in finding out whether the 
borrower is likely to default by assessing hidden characteristics and actions. The borrower 
may transmit to the lender several signals that influence default risk. A borrowers' own 
effort in terms of farm development can suggest work ethics and effort level. However, a 
small, poor borrower may possess equally acceptable work ethic but lacks the financial 
ability to initiate a sizable investment. Lenders may develop a selection criterion that often 
tend to ration out small farmers . The key is to identify the best proxy signal. Three examples 
commonly practiced in the screening process by lenders in Pakistan are discussed by Aleen 
(1993). First, lenders avoid new entrants without any previous loan dealings. Second, the 
lender investigates the applicants' indebtedness by talking to the village neighbors or 
relatives. Third, the lender may decide to start off the new borrower with a small probational 
loan amount which does not satisfy the borrower's legitimate credi t needs. The lender's 
screening process balances all sources of default risk as perceived in the signals and 
approximately matches the degree of default risk with the signals in setting the long run 
default risk management strategies (Arrow, 1963; Stiglitz, 1975). 
Adverse selection and moral hazard 
The problems of adverse selection and moral hazard are considered as a more general 
feature of asymmetric information. Adverse selection refers to the inability oflenders to 
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infer the risk characteristics of borrowers, while moral hazard refers to lack of knowledge 
about the actions of agents (borrowers, managers of institutions. and others invo lved in the 
credit relationship). Adverse selection results in a situation where borrowers can distinguish 
themselves but lenders treat them as if identical (Katze and Rosen 199 1 ). Borrowers who 
feel that they deserve better treatment may decide to withdraw if they get the impression that 
the lender cannot distinguish them from more ri sky borrowers (potential defaulters). ff a 
significant number of viable borrowers (good borrowers) w ithdraw, the s ignals sent to 
lenders would be largely from potential defaulters. In such a case. it may be difficult to 
develop important and useful distinguishing signals (for example, the in-kind rural credit 
system in developing countries is perceived by good borrowers as a mistrust of borrowers' 
ability to use loan funds for purposes approved). If the lender is incapable of accurate 
assessment of borrowers so that those identified to be good over time are provided with their 
rightful incentives and remuneration, lenders will tend to hold low quali ty loans. This a 
situation of a moral hazard when attempting to allocate resources. 
Agency-Principal problem 
Literature views specialized credit dispensing as a "layered web" of relationships 
among several parties (Barnea et, al.. 1985; Stigli tz. 1987 and Braverman and Guascb, 
1989). The government's target is the small farmer. To serve the farmer, the government 
(principal) appoints a credit institution (agent). The (principal) establishes a contract with the 
agent. In turn, the credit institution establishes a sub-contract with the borrower. The credit 
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institution becomes an intermediary principal between the government and the borrower. To 
accomplish the common economic development objective, the government establishes two 
incentive and reward plans. The first one is directed to the lender (sub agent), and the second 
to the borrower (full agent) . Each incentive and reward will be contingent on the nature of 
the contract structure and information flow among the parties, which in turn will determine 
the level of effort the agents exert. Financial managers stand between the credit market and 
the operations of the lending institution. Managers are expected to maximize government 
interests however, economics teaches that human beings tend to act on their own self-
interest. Thus risk perception and valuation rules may differ when an agent makes decisions 
on behalf of the principal. The conflicting interests between the two has adverse effects in 
the capital structure and the allocation of resources within the institution (Barnea et al. , 1985) 
and results in moral hazard problem. An example of moral hazard within the insurance 
markets is explained by Arrow (1963). He observed that the insured may participate in 
careless actions that may facilitate occurrence of an accident at the expense of the insurer. 
Within the labor markets, moral hazard arises between employees and employer. When an 
employee is left unsupervised, the employer may not be sure whether the employee earned a 
rightful wage or took a nap and got paid for it. Hoff et al. (1993) points out key strategies 
for reduc ing moral hazard. External and internal monitoring, incentives, and organizational 
and contract design that most efficiently accomplish a given objective usually reduce moral 
hazard problems. Katze and Rosen ( 1991) also note that incentives improve the effort level 
of the agent but may not completely eliminate problems. 
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Appropriate incentives and contracts motivate managers to take actions that minimize 
ineffic iency at all levels. Managers can maximize loan portfo lio to targeted groups. carry out 
consistent and accurate credit evaluation. and ensure that appropriate projects are financed. 
They can design ways to reduce patronage and ensure institutional financial viability by 
minimizing loan default risk. Equally essential is proper incentive package for borrowers. 
Motivation to select the right agricultural projects, el iminate desire to divert loan funds to 
non-agricultural projects, and comply with loan repayment agreement could occur. 
Transaction cost and enforceability of contacts 
Information has an impact on costs. Every credit transaction and acquisition of long-
term loan assets usually increases the complexi ty of credit contact. Gardner and Mills (1991) 
observed that formalizing or legalizing costs, costs for monitoring borrowers, and contract 
adjustments costs can be substantial. Credit also leads to the need to maintain a formal 
memory for operations, an additional cost (Penson and Lins 1980). 
Cost of operation focuses on effectiveness and efficiency of the system. In a 
competiti ve market, costs can be controlled or offset by market price (interest rates) 
adjustments. Below market rates do not provide adjustment opportunities in cost 
management or in default risk strategies. Services are thus exchanged on a non-price 
mechanism, that is, on the bas is of expected transaction cost and perceived default ri sk. 
Lenders favo r large farmers because the large loans provide scale or size economies. 
The abili ty of a lender to enfo rce a contract is critical. Stiglitz and Weiss (198 1) 
pointed out that lenders often assumed that the debt-financed project is obvious public 
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information. This suggests that lenders believe that borrowers willingness to repay their 
debts is influenced by debt publicity. Therefore. as long as the expected returns from the 
project exceeded debt installment, the lender would be repaid . Possession of collateral 
provide a lender with extra cushion, but the ability to dispose of it when need arises requires 
complete price information on the asset. In this respect, the rural debts in LDCs are like 
sovereign debt, where the borrower is a sovereign country and is not subject to penalty by 
national law. Rural debtors are often embedded in cultural and socio-economic ties. Lack of 
information of transferability of land assets results in incomplete asset markets. Okorie and 
Inheanacho (1992) reemphasize this observation by showing that the strategy adopted in a 
contract enforcement will either accelerate or decelerate default risk depending on whether 
the lender has the correct perception of social and economic aspects of the rural area in 
question. 
Effectiveness of a contract can be measured in terms of its cost. Information 
regarding the selection of an enforcement strategy and the legal costs are impediments in 
contract enforcement in credit markets. Wrong strategies can also trigger a social uproar and 
political interference in loan collection. 
Lack of enforceability has serious adverse effects within a community information 
network. Information about consequences of undesired actions is quickly past on among 
fam ilies. friends, church groups and informal gatherings. Weaknesses within a program are 
extremely dangerous. For example, consider a farmer who is interested in financing a non-
agricultural project and has no means of obtaining the level of credit he requires. He knows 
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that his neighbor and brother obtained credit from the local agricultural credit institution and 
managed to divert part. or all of the funds. He will consult with the two and apply similar 
tricks. They become "birds of the same feather" and begin to protect each other. Depending 
on their ingenuity and skill and contract enforcement problems, they maintain the process 
while others fo llow suit. Defaulting borrowers resort to similar strategies. To a new default 
entrant, what is important is the size of the default group; the larger the better. If everyone 
has to face adverse consequences at one point in time, he believes he is unlikely to be the first 
one nor the only one to be dealt with. 
The foregoing discussion conceptualizes the difficulties in establishing healthy 
lender-borrower credit relationship. The borrower is encouraged to default because if the 
default amount is reinvested, the returns obtained from the investment are improvement in 
utility over and above the present level. In essence, utility is derived as an expected marginal 
benefit from default. If the borrower defaults without any partial repayment, then the 
borrower's utili ty is at its maximum and is equal to the present value of the absolute default 
amount. 
Default may thus vary with borrower characteristics such that severity of the default 
is determined by factors that influence behavior such as the demographic characteristics (age, 
profession, and education of the borrower) (Dunn and Frey, 1976; Hardy and Weed, 1980; 
Stover and Gardner, 1985; Turvey and Brown, 1990; Miller and LaDue, 1989; Turvey and 
Weersink. 1993). 
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Conclusion 
The literature presented in this section does not fully cover the complexity of default 
risk problem. For example, it has not covered the role of external forces such as natural 
calamities (drought, earthquake, death and illness) that alter behavior in some instances. It 
however touches on the key issues that need to be put on perspective in default analysis. The 
primary concern is that the lender (government-sponsored credit institution) has conflicting 
objectives (Barnea et al., 1985). One is to promote efficiency by maximizing lending capacity. 
The other is equity. by not allowing external events to determine the distribution of credit to 
target farm borrowers. The conflict arise because imperfect measures are used to design loan 
contracts ; (Stigli t.z, 1987). A critical problem in a poorly designed contract is non-commitment 
to agreements and promises specified in the contract. Loan default is common and the serious 
problem is that the risk of default by borrowers has an Wlderlying signifi cant effect on credit 
decisions and thus leads to sub-optimal credit allocation. 
Loan default consequences are not limited to lenders only, borrowers and the society 
also suffer the effects. Widespread and excessive loan default can set off a wave of 
detrimental outcomes. In the short run, lenders suffer ill iquid ity, borrowers lose equity and it 
shrinks the fund "pie" for the society. In the long run, it leads to bankruptcy and eliminates the 
credit rrittrniriation of firms resulting from firm financial fai lure is a reoccurring phenomenon 
of business which may occur when a firm is Wlable to meet its financial contractual obligations. 
Lev (1974) pointed out that failure is a costly event. Many groups who have vested interest in 
the firm as well as some sectors of the economy incur direct or indirect losses. Suppliers may 
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loose the market share of their products provided by the fai ling firm, customers may loose 
supply of firm specific products and employees may loose their jobs. 
Up to this point, the literature emphasizes the important role that information plays in 
credit granting decisions. Lenders, borrowers and the society stand to suffer when poor credit 
decisions are made. Lenders are able to guard against bankruptcy by accurate assessment of 
borrowers' credit-worthiness. For loans already made, lenders can assess their quality from 
time to time and make corrections if necessary. 
The next section reviews literature in two areas. The first is literature on factors that 
influence firm fai lure. The second part is literature on factors that influence loan default. 
Together, the two parts are intended to provide further insight in default analysis. In each part 
of the sections these factors are considered as firm and borrower characteristics respectively. 
The literature reviewed in the first part is mainly from firm failure studies. while the second part 
is from loan repayment prediction studies. The review is to help identify factors that have been 
found important in earlier studies. 
Factors that Influence Financial Failure from Bankruptcy Studies 
Defining financial failure 
Literature definition of firm failure is largely based on the objective and the scope of 
the research study. Giroux (1984) defined firm failure as any event(s) that signal the firm 
may be experiencing financial difficulties or stress. The events range in their level of 
severity which may suggest the degree of failure . Firm financial failure may range from mild 
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to total failure or bankruptcy. Tevlin et al. (1978) describes firm financial failure by using 
three financial terminology which represent the degree of failure. Economic failure arises 
when a firm is not able to generate adequate revenue to cover expenses. This condition is 
considered as a mild failure because it is a common but is a temporary posi tion in many 
business firms. Technical insolvency arises when a firm has positive net worth but 
experiencing a shortage in meeting current liabilities. Bankruptcy is a situation whereby a 
firm has negative net worth as well as insufficient liquidity. At this point, a firm is either 
going though reorganization or being dissolved. A bankrupt firm will go into a legal process 
whereby it is put under the protection of the bankruptcy court, allowing it to keep on 
operating while arrangements are made to pay off its creditors in an equitable way (Shapiro. 
1990). 
Firm fai lure studies identify two empirical approaches to understanding factors that 
failures. The financial and accounting ratio approach attempts to identify ratios that explain 
firm failure process. A second approach focuses on a firm 's pre-failure financial condition 
and any events that signal the fai lure process. Financial and accounting ratio approach 
method uses models that classify firms as bankrupt or non-bankrupt. 
Ratio analysis 
N urnerous financial ratios can be constructed from balance sheets and income 
statements of a business. Beaver ( 1966), who is considered to have pioneered thi s approach, 
examined thirty financial and accounting ratios. Using single ratio models, he identified 
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three ratios which proved to have superior predictive power for firm failure. These ratios 
were: (a) cash flow to total assets, (b) net income to total debt, and (c) cash flow to debt. 
These ratios are negatively related to the financial strength of a firm. Later studies (Altman, 
1968; Blum, 1974; Haldeman and Narayan, 1977; Norton and Smith, 1979) applied the same 
approach modified by relying on multivariate models to predict failure . They viewed firm 
failure as a complex phenomenon that involves several explanatory variables. 
Altman (1968), considered to be the original initiator of multivariate models 
developed and derived coefficients of four financial ratios that were important in identifying 
a firm that is experiencing financial difficulties of various degrees. The ratios were: (a) 
Altman's model, which is known today as Altman's Z-score, measures the level of the 
financial condition of a firm. To obtain the Z-score, the computed values of the four 
financial ratios from the firm's financial statements are multiplied by Altman coefficients and 
then summed. The Z-score would show whether the finn has failed, has not failed or is in 
neutral position. Edmister (1972) modified Altman's (1968) model by dividing the values of 
the Z-score by the averages of the financial ratios in the small business industry. Edmister's 
( 1972) model provided an empirical tool for predicting failure within the small business 
industry . 
Within the agricultural sector, similar ratios have been applied to analyze the financial 
condition of borrowers in loan assessment studies. Turvey and Brown (1990) and Miller and 
LaDue (1989) developed failure prediction models that were based on ratio analysis. Most 
studies use financial ratios that measure liquidity, profitability, efficiency, leverage, debt 
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repayment capacity, and incorporate borrower demographic characteristics as explanatory 
variables. Turvey and Brown ( 1990) extended their analysis to capture covariance that 
incorporate differences in regions and farm sizes for Canadian farm borrowers. 
Dunn et al. (1976) determined which characteristics distinguish loans that become 
problematic and those that maintain quaJity several years after being granted. They used data 
obtained from loans made to Production Credit Association (PAC) cash grains in lll inois. 
These loans were advanced between 1964-1968 but were still active in 1971 . The PCA 
classified their loans ranging from those of highest quality to loans that exhibited significant 
repayment weakness. Dunn et al. excluded loans that were classified as " loss'· cases and 
concentrated on successful loans using information contained in the application form as of 
origination date. The ratios were total liability to tota l asset ratio, the amount of credit line of 
the applicant, and the amount of PCA Joan as a proportion of cash income. Of these three 
ratios, total liability to total assets held was by far highest in explanatory power. The model 
correctly classified 75 percent of the loans in the sample compared to 50 percent correctl y 
classified by lenders who did not use Dunn et al. model. 
Alcott's ( 1985) discussion on the importance of establishing a loan quality rating 
system by agricultural lenders suggested that lenders should classify borrowers' accounts into 
groups according to specific financial ratios. She suggested the following: liquid ity (debt 
structure ratio. debt to dollar sales ratio, debt to milk sales ratio and debt to income ratio), 
and profitability (return on investment, return on equi ty), and efficiency (pounds of milk sold 
per cow, replacement stock ratio, feed cost per milk income, machinery and real estate per 
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cow. total investment per cow. Lota! investment per man, and capital turnover) . These ratio 
categories were then weighted according to perceived priori ty. The perceived priority as 
suggested in this study, depended on the experience of the bank officiaJ. Several loan 
officers may be asked to independently attach a weight to each of the ratios. If a weight of 
''4" is the highest weight then it would be attached to the ratio perceived to be the most 
important and " l" to the ratjo perceived to be least important. The actual ratio times the 
assigned weight form the weighted score. After the scores are summed, the borrower is then 
placed in one of relevant risk categories. The higher the score, the stronger the repayment 
ability of the borrower. According to Alcott, financial ratios are the most important 
perceived factor that influence credit quality. She concluded that the elimination of credit 
assessment decisions which are based on instinct would force lenders to introduce objectivity 
in farm credit analysis. 
Firm failure models have been successfully extended to other related uses. Besides 
helping to explain why a firm failure occurred, they have helped predict what might happen 
in to a loan in the future given that some conditions hold true. 
Characteristics of Loan Defaulters from Repayment Prediction Studies 
Definition of a loan defaulter 
ln the credit scoring studies. loan defaulters have often been referred to as bad 
borrowers, unacceptable or problem borrowers, poor risk and unsuccessfu l clients (Dunn and 
94 
Frey. 1976; Hardy and Weed, 1980). The default definitions or classification. referred to in 
these studies were determined by the observed positive outstanding due balance (arrears). 
Repayment prediction (scoring) models have become popular credit decision tools. A 
credit score is basically a forecast of what will happen to various categories of loans already 
issued or under consideration. As decision tools for granting a loan, they are forecasts of 
what the borrower's performance will be if the Joan is granted. They have three major 
categories for application: ( 1) decisions whether to grant a loan or not. (2) loan review 
models that are associated with monitoring the risk of existing loans, and (3) bankruptcy 
prediction models that can be used for preliminary credit screening (Batubiza and Leatham, 
J 990). Decisions can be based on highly subjective and/or objective analysis aided by simple 
to highly sophisticated techniques. These models have helped in unifying credit decisions by 
different loan officers. Although the fundamental principles in credit decisions remain the 
same, the attributes will depend mainly on practical lending situations. 
The more recent repayment prediction models have recognized that a farm business is 
often part of a family household , a business setting that often influences loan repayment 
ability of a farm borrower. Farmers often prioritize all financia l obligations accord ing to 
their urgency and by what is perceived to provide the best opportunities. In LDCs it is not 
surprising to find that first in priority is to ensure that the basic needs of food and housing for 
the fami ly are met, fo llowed by social obligations (for example a wedding of a son), 
educational needs fo r the children for the long term income security, and finally, the more 
long run, less urgent investment in commercial agriculture (Devereux et al. , 1990). 
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Incorporation of financial and demographic attributes of a borrower become particularly 
important. Durand ( 1941 ), the pioneer of prediction studies, classified borrowers by their 
socio-economic characteristics in trying to provide useful insights about their contribution to 
credit quality. 
Financial characteristics of defaulters 
Farm income 
Durand (1941 ) analyzed debt repayment performance of mixed sample of good 
(borrowers who were current in debt repayment ) and bad (borrowers whose accounts were 
delinquent) consumer loans made before 1941. Durand's study provided empirical evidence 
that borrower s income only moderately influenced risk of default. Better indicators for 
credit quality for this sample were borrower possession of real estate, bank account or life 
insurance. Lenders at this point in time, however, emphasized the applicant' s total liabilities 
for lending decisions other than the indicators that Durand identified. Latter studies have 
considered income in terms of profitability and efficiency of returns to assets . 
Non-farm income 
Peterson (1980) analyzed the quality of credit advance by a USA commercial bank in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. This study focused on source of employment as an important 
factor in assessing credit risk. Sources of employment that were found to be associated with 
below average relative risk included government civilian employment, banking finance, and 
real estate. Those employed in construction, wholesale and retail trade, and manufacturing 
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exhibited above average credit risk. Based on the results of this study, Peterson pointed out 
that lenders could improve credit quality by occupation and employment source 
considerations in credit assessment process. Durand ( I 941 ) found that those who worked in 
industry had low average credit risk. 
Employment status 
Off-farm employment offers a borrower an additional source of income and as such, 
indicates that the borrower does not entirely depend on farm income. They also have 
opportunities of making more frequent instaJlment payments as opposed to the unemployed. 
Wage income reduce the risk of fluctuations in farm income. This may result from seasonal 
variations in the size of the harvest and the prices (Southwold- Llewelyn, 1991 ). 
Equity contribution 
In the auto industry, Peterson and Peterson (1984) investigated the extent to which 
auto loans obtained from commercial banks would be improved if banks adjusted loan terms 
such as down payment. This study revealed that when down payment was held constant, 
young borrowers and borrowers employed in highly cyclical industries had what was 
considered above average credit risk. On the other hand, young borrowers maintained below 
average risk on loans that required high down payment. Turvey and Weersink (1993) 
showed that debt relative to equity increases for risky investment. 
Collateral value 
Its value indicates the gross worth of a borrower. Although not a necessary nor 
sufficient condition for the applicant to be considered credit-worthy, it provides some 
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information about the previous commitment the borrower has toward improving the farm. 
Relatively high security value is expected to positively influence loan repayment since it 
gives the lender an opportunity to recover outstanding principal and accrued interest in a 
foreclosure situation. 
Hardy et al. (1985) constructed ratios to examine the agricultural real estate credit 
market. The study focused on establishing borrower, loan and farm business characteristics 
which were the best determinants of good Joans and bad loans (borrowers whose loans had 
deteriorated up to foreclosure stage). They also intended to establish whether the agricultural 
financial institutions that existed at the time of their study differed significantly from those of 
earlier periods. Data for the study was obtained from loan files of the Federal Land Bank 
(FLB) in the Fifth Farm Credit District, Jackson Mississippi in the Spring of 1985. The 
stratified random sample loan accounts used represented Joans closed between January 1, 
1979, and December 31, 1981 in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. The sampled loans 
were old enough to provide adequate information whether a borrower would be capable of 
meeting repayment obligations over time. The sample data composed of a total of 68 
observations classified as good loans and 76 observations were loans that had been 
foreclosed. Four borrower characteristics found to be important in discriminating between 
good and bad loans were: total debt service to total income ratio, acres on security to acres 
owned ratio , loan amount to appraised value ratio, and the debt to asset ratio. This model 
correctly classified 82.6 percent of the sample. 
Managerial characteristics of defaulters 
Cost of operations and poor records 
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Carson ( 197 I) sampled successful credit farmers in South Dakota to investigate 
factors that determine credit quality. The sample was composed of 100 existing farm 
operating loans from PCA borrowers and 100 from Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) 
borrowers. These Joans were obtained between 1955 and 1964. At origination. the 
borrowers were all high quality but by 1965, half of the loans were showing signs of 
repayment problems. Carson' s ( 1971) study focused on loans that were at least successful 
for the first two years before his study. He was unconcerned about the lenders correct or 
incorrect evaluation of the loans at the loan granting stage. He made no distinction between 
the wide range of farm sizes (ranging between 80 acre crop farms to 5000 acre ranches). The 
data was extracted from the original loan application forms held by the lenders. 
The results of this study indicated that 23 characteristics from the applications 
obtained in first year ( 1955) were not significant while the 15 characteristics of the 
applications of the last year (1964) showed significant differences. The significant 
characteristics associated with unsuccessful PCA loans were high ratio of debt to assets 
owned. high cost of operations, poor production records, high ratio of debt to net worth, and 
the large size of borrower's household. For the same category of unsuccessful Joans 
extended by FmHA, the five most important characteristics were the ratio ofFmHA loans to 
poor production records, the high cost of operation, the high ratio of non-real estate debt to 
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total debt, the high ratio of non real estate debt to the value of non-real estate assets, and the 
low ratio of net worth to total assets owned. 
Repayment capacity 
Tongate ( 1984) was concerned about the after-the-fact credit classification practiced 
by credit reviewers. According to Tongate, credit review classification does not provide an 
early warning of the future ri sk class of a loan. Tongate suggested an improved classification 
that incorporates the position of loan portfolio in the future . His study identified 60 to 70 
factors contributing to risk. The factors were then split into two groups: environmental 
factors and loan specific factors. Using six years of historical data obtained from active loans 
and loans already charged off in 1982, the study identified fi ve important factors: owners 
equity; collateral; repayment capacity; the ratio of volume of farm production to debt, and 
loan size. 
These variables were assigned scores as follows: owners equity, up to 40 points; 
collateral , 20 points; repayment capacity, 15 points; and loan size, 10 points. Three risk 
categories were developed, low risk, moderate risk, and high risk. For owner's equity, a ratio 
of 60 percent or more was categorized as low ri sk ( assigned a score of 0). a ratio of 40-60 
percent as moderate risk (assigned a score of 20), and a ratio of 40 percent or less, high risk 
(assigned a score of 40). 
Lufburrow et al. (l 984) developed a credit scoring technique for pricing loans to 
individual farm borrowers. The sample was collected from five PCA borrowers in Illinois 
using 1982 data. These PCAs classify their borrowers into three risk classes for loan pricing 
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purposes. Class 1, prime (lowest risk), Class II, base (intermediate risk), and class Ill. 
premium (highest risk). Prob it model was used to test the significance of borrower 
characteristics important in determining the risk category of the borrower. The independent 
variables were liquidity, leverage, profi tability, collateral , repayment ability, and repayment 
history. Tenure and profitability were insignificant and were thus omitted from the model. 
Of the three categories, Class I had the greatest accuracy of 94 percent , Class Ill was second 
with accuracy of 91 percent while Class II had the lowest accuracy of 13 percent. Lufburrow 
et al. suggested that the estimation procedure should be geared towards the characteristics of 
specific lenders, location and type of borrower. 
Turvey ( 1990) found repayment abi lity as measured by interest coverage to reduce the 
risk of loan default among Canadian farmers. 
Demographic characteristics 
Age 
Literature associates age with responsibility--older borrowers are more responsible 
and risk averse than younger borrowers (Aguilera-Alfred and Gonzalera-Yega, 1993). The 
age of the borrower is considered to be a factor in explaining attitude towards debt 
repayment. Lenders find it easier to assess repayment ability of older applicants since they 
may have more information on their previous financial dealings than their younger 
counterparts. Younger borrowers possess relatively less information in terms of past records. 
But younger borrowers are more innovative and ambitious than older borrowers. Mbatia 
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(1985) found that farmers between age 30-40 were most innovative and also had superior 
repayment. 
Farm size 
Given that technological effects on productivity is constant, in LDCs, differences in 
returns to scale of production can be explained by farm size differences (Feder, 1984). For a 
variety of reasons, input-output prices which farmers face differ systematically with holding 
size. Thus input/output ratios and revenues tend to vary with farm size. When credit is 
avai lable, farmers can hire farm workers. Supervision level of the workers produces a 
systematic relationship between per acre yields and farm size. In an imperfect credit market 
where credit supply is evaluated in accordance to the collateral (land owned), the level of 
supervision of hired farm workers can produce significant differences in scale of production. 
The land resource utilization and returns will depend on the relative magnitude of output 
elasticity with respect to effective labor. Labor effort elasticity with respect to effective 
supervision has a systematic effect on the per acre yields. 
Experience 
Experience is a proxy for stability in farm management and business. As noted by 
Lee et al (1980), inexperience and lack of initiative are detrimental to farm operations. The 
longer a farmer has been engaged in managing a particular business the better the 
management skills. Stover et al. ( 1985) observed that lenders' perceived low farm 
management ability by borrowers has a stronger negative effects on loan decisions than the 
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opposing effects of high management. Poor management abi lity are offset by highly liquid 
collateral but not the reverse. 
Most of these studies apply multivariate statistical techniques to data obtained from 
agricultural enterprises and debtor's personal information. Loans were classified in various 
ways as current or in default, acceptable or problem, poor risk or good ri sk. and successful or 
unsuccessful. The loan classes were determined according to statistical procedures or 
through experience of the developer of the model. In some cases, customers and/or loan 
officer opinion is obtained for classification purposes. 
Conclusions 
The economic theories and empirical results of the studies reviewed contribute 
valuable information for default analysis. The first section of the literature provides a 
conceptual underpinning of the problem. It looked at the evolution of incentives and 
imperfect information to latest difficulties of imperfect enforcement in credit markets . The 
broader perspective that the literature provides is insight on what is entai led in borrower-
lender relationship considerations . Important factors involved in screening borrowers to 
reduce default ri sk are related to incentives within the loan policies. For example, loan 
related factors such as loan amount and services provided which will induce borrowers to 
take actions that reduce default. Expansion of resources to intensify monitoring and 
enforcement would limit the scope of the institution in lending. Some inferences can be 
drawn from this literature in identifying key factors influence credit-worthiness of borrowers. 
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The literature urge that borrowers have an incentive to cheat on contract. Moreover, 
borrowers' own initiative to evolve a healthy relationship with the lender is self-enforcing 
will not achieve desired perf onnance. 
The second part of the literature is largely empirical and looked at factors that 
influence firm failure as part the reasons for default and credit risk. These empirical studies 
have evolved since the 1940s. Most models have identified personal characteristics, 
demographic characteristics, financial characteristics to be important attributes to failure. 
However, risk factors are not stationary (Gustafson, 1989). Neither are they homogeneous 
across samples used in the various studies. Therefore, these models have been almost strictly 
sample dependent. This problem can also be traced to specification as well as estimation 
difficulties. 
This study therefore states a general hypothesis that loan default for AFC can be 
explained by applying the concepts and insightful results from these empirical studies. The 
hypothesis for this study based on the literature states that demographic characteristics and 
loan related characteristics do influence loan repayment performance. The general model that 
these studies suggest is as follows: 
Y; = f ( D, E) 
Where Y; = Probability of acceptable loan repayment performance, 
D = Demographic characteristics of borrower i , 
E = Loan related characteristics of borrower i 
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In the next chapter, AFC sample is analyzed to empiricall y identify factors that 
significantly influence loan repayment perfonnance for AFC borrowers. As already 
mentioned these models are in general region specific, and the relative importance of the 
variables in influencing repayment performance may differ with regions. 
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CHAPTER 4: DAT A AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter presents the data used for estimating the empirical results for this study. 
First, it explains source and the sampling method of the dataset. Second, it presents a 
description of the AFC lending volume by Kenya's provinces, AFC operational regions, and 
distribution of loans by loan type within the AFC operational regions. Third, the sources of 
default problems using descriptive statistics is identified. Distribution of loans by various 
loan and borrower characteristics is examined, and the incidence and intensity of default 
based on the characteristics is established. Further insights from the conceptual discussion in 
the preceding chapter are used in identifying influential factors to be incorporated in the 
model. Finally, factors identified as having a strong relationship with default are then 
selected and used in the default analysis model. 
The Data 
In this study, a systematic sample of Kenya's AFC farm loans extended between 
January 1987 and June 1993 is used to examine the relationship between loan repayment 
ability and selected characteristics that are believed to be important in loan repayment 
performance. The data represent 1,574 borrowers holding 2,050 loan accounts. The unit of 
analysis for this study is the loan account. Demographic and loan 1 information for each 
borrower and account were extracted from the borrowers ' files contained in the AFC 
computerized database. Some additional information was obtained from branch offices. 
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The sample information extracted is the information normally gathered for making loan 
decisions and for collection purposes. Data on the following demographic and loan 
characteristics was obtained. Demographic information: (I) geographic location, (2) age, (3) 
highest level of education attained, ( 4) employment status, (5) farming experience,(6) value of 
collateral and other nonfarrn assets, (7) total farm size owned, and; loan information: ( 1) loan 
sequence, (2) project financed by loan funds (enterprises), (3) the actual loan amount approved 
( 4) date of loan approval, ( 5) loan repayment terms--repayment mode (whether the borrower 
has a monthly remittances from wages, the marketing body where the farm produce is sold or a 
banker). (6) installment date, (7) unrnatured loan balance (principal and interest), and (8) loan 
amount in arrears (principle and interest). 
The sampling method 
The systematic sampling of AFC farm clients for FY 1987/88 through 1991/92 targeted 
at least 1,003 farm clients. The representative sample size was based on the total number of 
AFC clients over the five-year period, determined from the December 1992 and March 1988 
AFC Statistical Digest. For sampling purposes, the loans were categorized by region (western 
and eastern), AFC branch, and loan type, that is, small-scale and large-scale (include ranch 
loans). 
The loan type category is based on the assumption that all farmers who owned less than 
or equal to fifty hectares of land held loans less than or equal to Ksh. 50 000. Likewise, farmers 
who owned more than fifty hectares are categorized as holding greater than Ksh. 50,000. The 
number of loans drawn from each category was based on the proportions of the accounts served 
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by each regional office to attain the expected number of observations for systematic sampling 
scheme. 
The regional distribution of borrowers for FY 1987 /87 through 1991 /92 by region. farm 
size, and loan size is presented in Table 4.1. This classification also determines the loan 
scheme according to small-scale and large-scale loans. There were 12,018 borrowers for the 
two regions 
The sampling was generally successful for information that was obtainable from the 
computerized database at AFC headquarters; however, information requested from the branch 
offices, which was mainly borrowers financial , marital, managerial , and value of off-farm 
income, was incomplete and therefore limi ting. This study used the information obtained 
from the head office. A total of 1,5 12 small -scale loan accounts, 59 large-scale loan 
accounts, and 480 SCCS loan accounts were used for the analysis. 
Table 4.1 . Distribution of borrowers by region, FY 1987/88-92. 
Loan size 
Western Region 
--------~---------- -----~~~.:.n-~~gi_~-----
Less than Greater than 
Farm Size Ksh. Ksh. 50,000 
50,000 
Less than 50 ha. 6,574 0 
(548) (0) 
Greater than 50 ha. 0 460 
(0) (39) 
Total 6,574 460 
Totals, Each 7,034 0 
Region (587) (0) 
Source: AFC Statistical Digest, 1988 and 1992. 
Less than Greater than 
Ksh. 50,000 Ksh. 50,000 
4,384 
(366) 
0 
0 
4,384 
4,984 
(416) 
0 
(0) 
600 
(50) 
600 
0 
(0) 
Note: The expected sample size per category is in parentheses. 
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Di tribution of Loan Funds by Administrative Provinces, AFC Regions, 
and by Loan Type 
This section focuses on factors that influence repayment performance. Many factors--
regional location, type of the loan, type of enterprises--may have some effect. Distribution of 
loans by geographic location of borrowers within Kenya's administrative provinces, AFC 
administrati ve regions. and by type of loan are therefore presented. Then. descriptive 
statistics of the data variables are analyzed. This analysis is followed by relating default 
incidence to selected variables. 
Distribution by Kenya's provinces 
Loan distribution of the entire AFC lending volume by administrative provinces is 
shown in Table 4.2. The table also presents the distribution by AFC administrative area 
(region) within each province. There are eight AFC administrative area offices: five in the 
western region and three in the eastern region . AFC administrative boundaries closely follow 
political administrative boundaries. As shown in Table 4.2 each province has one area office 
except for Rift Valley, which has three area offices. Notice that borrowers in the Central and 
Coast provinces share one AFC area office. 
Distribution of loans by AFC operational regions 
The size of an AFC area office's operational coverage is determined by the ( I) 
population demanding loans, (2) efficiency in communication between branch offices that 
compose the area. and (3) political administration boundaries for faci litating other services 
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Table 4.2. Distribution of AFC lending operations within Kenya's provinces, volume of 
lending, by province, and AFC area offi ces within the province 
Percentage Number Total Percentage of 
Distribution AFC of AFC Number AFC Total Arrears 
Area of Total Land Areas Branch of AFC Portfo lio (%) 
Province ( 1,000 Ha) Area Offices Offices Borrowers (Ksh 000) 
Central and 
Coast 9 6, 198 239,4 11 54.00 
12,322.30 2.30 
Coast 8,430.90 14.63 
North Eastern 12,749.40 22. 13 5 1,145 208,811 62.00 
Eastern ] 5,377.30 26.69 9 4,897 255,361 86.00 
Nairobi 75.4 0.13 HQa 
Rift Valley 17,512.60 30.40 3 16 17,673 1,974,454 66.90 
Nyanza 1,267.30 2.20 5 6,655 282,369 69.00 
Western 872.2 1.52 5 7,854 284,495 80.10 
Total 57,607.20 100.00 8 49 44,422 3,244,901 60.00 
AFC headquarters. 
such as land registration (Figure 4.1 ). The higher the population, the more the branches in a 
particular area. The socio-economic activities within a geographic area differ markedly and 
are influenced by ecological conditions, land tenure system, and ethnicity. AFC areas that 
include nomadic ethnic groups, which have low agricultural potential and a communal land 
tenure system are generally large. Table 4.3 also shows the number of branches supervised 
by each area office, the number of borrowers in each area, total AFC area loan portfolios and 
the percentage of these portfolios in arrears as of June 1993 . 
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Table 4.3 shows loan distribution by AFC regions for the sample. In terms of the 
absolute number of borrowers, the Mt. Kenya area has the highest, followed by the Eastern 
area. Because Mt. Kenya is dominated by very small farms, it is probable that these farms 
are limited as to the level of investment. The North Rift and South Rift areas have the 
highest Joan volume. The Coast and South Rift areas are dominated by beef and wheat 
production, respectively, which explains the relatively higher average loan size. The Mt. 
Kenya and North Rift areas are dominated by dairy and mixed farms. 
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of AFC area offices within Kenya. Towards the 
coastal, northeastern, and north parts of Kenya the area offices are more scattered, confirming 
the low agricultural potentiality of the region. 
AFC lending activities are reported on a Joan scheme basis. Because the loan scheme 
is an important aspect of funding sources and lending operations, this study adopts a similar 
analytical framework for AFC default problems. The next section analyses the distribution of 
loan funds of the sample by loan scheme (AFC small scale, AFC large scale and SCCS) and 
by area. The following section also summarizes the descriptive statistics of the data. 
Average values of selected variables from the sample are analyzed by loan scheme. The last 
section of this chapter identifies variables that have a high incidence of defaulted accounts. 
Variables that are found to be important are then used in the empirical analysis presented in 
Chapter 5 for predicting repayment performance. 
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Figure 4.1 Distribution of Agricultural Finance Corporation Regional and Area 
Offices within Kenya's provinces. 
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Table 4.3 . Loan distribution, by region (area) 
Percentage 
Percentage Average Total loan Distribution 
Number of Distribution Loan Size Volume of Loan 
Area Loans of Loans (Ksh.) (Ksh.) Volume 
Eastern 320 16.0 62,625 20,040,074 9.0 
Mt. Kenya 593 29.0 26 560 15,750,054 7. 1 
North Rift 273 13.0 268.723 73,361,391 33.9 
Coast 43 2.0 352,172 15, 143,399 6.8 
Central Rift 25 1 12.0 57,723 14,488,498 6.5 
Western 299 15.0 47,541 14,2 14,695 6.4 
Nyanza 135 6.0 83,909 11 327,780 5.1 
South Rift 136 7.0 431 ,435 58,675, 125 26.0 
Total 2,050 100.0 223.000,000 100.0 
Distribution by loan type 
The sample drawn from each region is as shown in Table 4.4. The actual number of 
observations exceeded the original expectations because ranch and SCCS loans were included. 
AFC loans are divided into two main categories: AFC scheme loans and SCCS loans. This 
distinction is important in assessing loan repayment performance later in this text. AFC 
scheme loans account for the highest share of total loans, at 77 percent, while SCCS loans 
account for 23 percent of total loans. Although large-scale loans account for only 3 percent 
of total AFC scheme loans, they account for 70 percent of the outstanding debt vo lume. 
Small-scale loans representing 74 percent of AFC scheme loans account for 30 percent of the 
debt volume. This imbalance implies that AFC directs a large proportion of its loan funds to 
a few large-scale borrowers, a situation observed in other studies on rural credit in LDCs 
discussed in Chapter 1. 
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Table 4.4. Distribution of loans, by loan type 
Loan type 
AFC Schemes 
Small- cale Loans 
Large-Scale Loans 
easonal Crop 
Credit Scheme 
Total 
Number of Distribution of 
Loan Accounts Loan accounts(%) 
1,5 12 
59 
480 
2,050 
74 
3 
23 
100 
Total Loan 
Amount 
(Ksh.) 
40, 194,010 
94,038,934 
88.768,072 
223,000.000 
Distribution 
of Funds(%) 
18.0 
42.2 
39.8 
100.0 
Table 4.5 shows the distribution of loan schemes by area and by loan type. The 
Eastern and Great Rift Valley (North, South and Central Rift) areas benefit most in all 
schemes. The Great Rift Valley leads in the number of SCCS loans, while Mt. Kenya leads 
in the number of small-scale loans. 
Descriptive Statistics of the Sample Variables 
The loans show a wide variation in mean values of selected variables (Table 4.6). 
The coefficient of variation for some variables such as loan amount is over 100 percent. For 
SCCS loans, the variations are much higher because these loans are not categorized by size. 
Mean loan amount for large-scale Joans is fifty-nine times greater than that of smale-scale 
loans and nine times greater than that of SCCS loans. The age of the loan from the date of 
approval to the date of sampling shows that SCCS loans averaged four years old, followed by 
small-scale loans which averaged five years old. Because SCCS loans are intended to repaid 
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Table 4.5. Distribution of loans, by area and loan type 
Number of SSL Number of LSL 
Area Accounts Accounts 
Central Rift 175 3 
Coast 37 5 
Eastern 297 21 
Mt. Kenya 565 
North Rift 95 7 
Nyanza I l 9 10 
South Rift 107 8 
Western 117 4 
Total 2,050 100 
Number of 
SCCSc Accounts 
73 
2 
28 
170 
6 
22 
178 
480 
SSL = Small-scale loans less than Ksh. 50,000, with a repayment period of not less than five years. 
bLSL = Large-scale loans greater than Ksh. 50,000, with a repayment period of greater than five 
years. 
cSCCS = Seasonal crop credit scheme for maize and wheat production with a repayment period of 
one year. 
on a yearly basis, the age of these loans is an indication of the aging of arrears for loans 
advanced prior to the 1993 crop season. The mean value of farm size between large-scale 
and smalJ-scale farms is enormous, which provides a strong reason for separating the loans 
by scheme to reduce variations due to size in the analysis. Standard defi nition of the 
variables for large-scale farms is also substantiall y higher than that of small-scale farms. 
Table 4.6. Mean values of selected sample variables by loan scheme 
Variable 
---LoanAffiount(ksh"S ___ Loan-oillatTofi-cffi"Ofiilisf--Loanlnstailn1en1(Ks11~-Aie-orth"e-co-an(years) . 
----- - - - - ---standard---- - -------sumda-;:d---- -------standard-- - - - ----st"aficiir<f" 
Loan Scheme N8 Mean 
Small-Scale 151 l 26,580 
59 1,593,880 Large-Scale 
sccsb 480 184,999 
Error N 
42.9 l 511 
I 87.7 59 
532.4 480 
Mean 
52.0 
113.0 
15.8 
Error N Mean 
27.8 1,502 8,098 
61.7 58 316,629 
69.0 480 98,789 
Variable 
error N 
65.8 1,511 
177.2 59 
396.0 480 
Mean 
3.0 
2.6 
4.0 
Error 
45.4 
62.3 
31.3 
----------------------------------- ------------------ -----------------
Farm size (ha) Security Value (Ksh.) Other Assets (Ksh.) Total Debt!fotal Assets 
- - - - - - - - --- - sta.nda!d--- - - - --- - - -standard-- - --- - --- -standar<l------- - - -s1Mi<lfild-
Loan Scheme N 
Small-Scale 1,511 
Large-Scale 59 
SCCS 480 
Mean 
3 
463 
45 
Error N Mean 
I 53.3 1511 209,800 
209.7 59 8,427,000 
657.9 480 2,587,000 
Error N Mean 
495 105 134,444 
147 NAC NA 
1,437.8 480 886,451 
Error N Mean 
95 .9 151 l 253 
NA 59 233.8 
327.2 480 171.4 
Error 
73.7 
104.7 
167.2 
Table 4.6. (continued) 
Variables 
Loan1ns!aTimenJLoru1A.ffiollilt-Ne"trru-rri-1ncoffie-(Ksl1.)--6ff':fann-1ncame-(Ksh.)-fo"tai&J)enses-(Ksl1.). 
- - - - --- - - - - - -standard----- - ---- --sta~lar-ct----- -----standard-- - -----s"ta"O<laJ:<l 
Loan Scheme N 
Small-Scale 1,502 
Large-Scale 58 
SCCS 480 
Mean 
0.32 
0.26 
1.0 
Error N Mean 
53.4 461 47,839 
97.3 13 1,234,886 
28.8 193 135,842 
Error N Mean 
79.3 303 41,557 
73.4 3 235,333 
382.9 87 29,726 
Variable 
Error 
119.7 
136.4 
135.8 
N Mean 
429 25,781 
3 75,000 
152 61 ,755 
Error 
8.4 
103.9 
786.5 
Borrower Age (Years) Farm Manager Experience (years) Number of Dependents 
------ - - --- -standard-- - --- - -----stfilidard-- - --- - - ---stfilidaid- - - - - --- --st"fili<lar<l- °' 
Loans Scheme N Mean Error N Mean Error N Mean Error N Mean Error 
Small-Scale 1,500 49.0 21.7 458 Borrower NIA0 357 13 72.4 447 6 59.9 
Large-Scale 46 44.0 31.1 18 Hired NIA 15 12 46.2 13 1 137.7 
SCCS 473 56.0 23. l 186 Borrower NIA 152 18 64.0 186 7 71.3 
8N = number of observations. 
~A = not applicable 
cNI A = not avai lable 
dSCCS = seasonal crop credit scheme 
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Distribution of Funds by Selected Performance Factors 
This section traces performance factors identified in Chapter 3 and relates them to the 
repayment performance of borrowers in this study. The factors are grouped into two 
categories, as defined in Chapter 3: demographic (geographic location of the borrower, age 
of the borrower, size of the farm the borrower owns in hectares, and employment status of the 
borrower) and loan (loan scheme loan duration, loan sequence (first-time or repeated 
borrowers), interest rates, and installment season). 
Demographic factors 
Geographic location 
AFC borrowers are concentrated in areas with high agricultural potential. as 
evidenced by the branch network concentration in these areas. In areas with lower 
agricultural potential branch offices are sparse and so is the intensity of AFC lending 
operations. The main characteristics of the areas are described below. 
Eastern and Coast areas: These areas run from the capital city of Nairobi to the 
northeastern parts of Kenya. The five branch offices in these areas are concentrated around 
the cities of Nairobi and Mombasa, cities that provide farmers with direct and competitive 
markets for farm produce. 
Mr. Kenya area: This area is characterized by highly mixed farms. It lies around the 
vicinity of Nairobi, providing farmers with a ready market for farm produce. Intensive land 
use allows farmers to produce high-value horticultural crops for the Nairobi market. 
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North Rift, South Rift. and Central Rift areas: These three areas cover Kenya's most 
productive region. the Great Rift Valley. The areas contain 16 branch offices. The sum of 
these three areas is considered the granary of Kenya in terms of land potential and enterprise 
diversity . 
Western and Nyanza areas: These two areas are highly populated, with the majority 
being traditional farmers. Production is 90 percent subsistence, and the population is highly 
ethnic. 
Age 
Distribution of loans by age reveals that older farmers (over 55 years) were the most 
frequent AFC borrowers, with average loans of Ksh.54,894. There were small variations in 
average loan amounts within the age group; however, the average loans among age group 35 
to 45 were highest. Younger farmers are less frequent borrowers and held the smallest 
average loan size, at Ksh.48,240. 
Farm size 
Loan distribution by farm size is shown in Table 4.8. The highest concentration of 
loans was for farms of 1.0 to 2.5 hectares. Average loans within this category were below 
Ksh.30,000. The largest average loan size (over Ksh.1.00 million) was held by farms in the 
20 to 35 hectare category, which represented 9 percent of total farms. 
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Table 4.8. Distribution ofloans, by farm size 
Percentage Percentage Average 
Fann Sizea Number of Total Total Loan Distribution Loan 
Category of Loans Loan Amount of Loan within 
(Ha) Accounts Accounts (Ksh.) Amounts Fann 1ze 
(%) (Ksh) 
0 - 1.0 562 27 13,394,154 6.0 23,833 
1.0 - 2.5 591 29 15,648,325 7.0 26,478 
2.5 - 3.5 177 9 4,464.310 2.0 25.222 
3.5 - 5.0 175 8 4,653,534 2. 1 26,592 
5.0 - 10.0 225 11 5,345 931 2.4 23.760 
10.0 - 20.0 138 7 3,970,043 1.8 28.768 
20.0 - 35.0 143 2 174,369,815 78.2 1.219 370 
Over 35.0 39 7 1, 154 904 0.5 29,613 
Total 2,050 100.0 223 ,000,000 100.0 1.08,780 
3The distribution for farm sizes between 20 and 35 hectares include SCCS loans. The bulk 
of SCCS loans fall within this farm-size category which explains the large average loan size. 
Loan factors 
Loan sequence: Ne w borrowers vs existing borrowers 
There were more entrants into AFC financing than there were borrowers continuing 
with AFC financi ng for second, third, and above loans. The proportion of new entrants into 
AFC financing was 44 percent, as opposed to 55 .6 percent for existing customers . In this 
latter category, most borrowers were holding a second loan. The borrower with the highest 
number of borrowings had a twenty-third loan. This ratio suggests that the demand for AFC 
loans is stronger for new borrowers. 
Some generalizations about loan demand and use can be made from this analysis. 
This section has shown that large-scale farm borrowers are generally few, but their average 
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credit fund outlay is much larger than any other type of borrower; dairy loans are popular and 
there is a high demand of credit from new entrants. 
Enterprises 
A range of eighteen enterprises were financed by AFC loans during the study period 
(Table 4.7). Dairy enterprises were the most common loan recipients at 40.5 percent, 
fo llowed by maize at 18 percent and poultry at 10.4 percent. The other fifteen types of 
enterprise each accounted for less than I 0 percent of loan distribution. This pattern of loan 
distribution indicates a higher concentration of loans for staple foods than fo r export crops 
such as tea and coffee. Within the AFC, intermediate loans for machinery tend to extract 
higher allocations of funds. Land is the most expensive item to finance, with loans averaging 
Ksh. 2 million. Beef production also ranks high, with average Joans of Ksh. 300,556. Dairy 
production is popular among small-scale farmers and loans averaged Ksh. 35.180. Seasonal 
crop loans for maize and wheat had higher loan averages than those observed in the other 
seasonal crops. The average size of maize loans six times lower than the average size of 
wheat loans. 
Loan duration 
Twenty three percent of the loans during the period studied were short term (one to 
two years), 74 percent were medium term (five to six years), and 0.03 percent were long 
term( seven to twenty years). The di stribution of loans by duration suggests that borrowers 
prefer medium-term rather than long-term loans, as dictated by need. 
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Table 4.7. Distribution of loans by enterprise, and average loan per enterprise 
Number Total Total Loan Distribution Average 
of Loans Amount of Loan Loan Size 
Loan Purpose Loans (%) (Ksh.) Volume (Ksh.) 
AFC schemes 
Beef 36 1.8 10,820.034 4.9 300,556 
Coffee 65 3.2 ) ,218.400 0.5 18,745 
Dairy 831 40.5 29,234,222 13. I 35,180 
Fruits 13 0.6 388,900 0.2 29.915 
Horticultural Crops 32 1.6 7,530,370 3.4 235,324 
Infrastructure 94 4.6 2,764,540 1.2 29,4 10 
Land Purchase 31 1.5 63,001.853 28.5 2,032,3 18 
Machinery 12 0.7 5,671,800 2.5 515,618 
Other Livestock 28 1.4 684.500 0.3 24,446 
Other Permanent Crops 4 0.2 64,000 0.0 16.000 
Other seasonal crops 13 0.6 237,000 0.1 47,400 
Pigs 82 4.0 1,591,420 0.7 19,407 
Poultry 214 10.4 5,251,755 2.4 24,541 
Semi-Permanent Crops 62 3.0 2,335,400 1.0 40,266 
Tea 54 2.6 1,229,900 0.6 88,921 
Seasonal Crop Credit 
Scheme 
Maize 378 18.4 33,612,090 15.1 22,776 
Wheat 101 4.9 55, 155,982 24.7 541 ,099 
Total for all schemes 2,050 100.0 223,000,000 100.0 
Large-scale and small-scale loans. 
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Defining and Identifying Defaulters 
In this section, the variables that have a strong relationship with default are identified. 
First. a dependent variable is defi ned, which is then related to the independent variabl.es. The 
expected relationship of the dependent variable and the independent variables is also 
hypothesized. econd, the procedure used fo r the empirical analysis is specified. Finall y. the 
model fo r predicting repayment by a borrower is defined. 
The dependent variable is the observed relative default rate on principal and interest 
payments (arrears). For comparison across borrowers with unequal loan amounts, it is 
plausible to construct a relative default model as defined below: 
Default rate = 
Total loan amount overdue(Principal + interest)(Ksh) 
Total loan amount borrowed(Ksh) 
Within the data, relative default is defined as the repayment performance of the 
borrower. Perfo rmance is shown to differ with region, loan scheme, and loan purpose, with 
the highest observed defau lt rate among Kenyan borrowers within the seasonal crop growing 
regions. Ideally. the default ratio should not exceed one by a very large margin. When all 
installments are past due, however, the ratio is greater than one and the level of default rate 
wi ll depend on the penalty charges accruing. This situation is more likely to occur wi th 
CCS credit loans than wi th other schemes. 
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Demographic, and loan scheme and default incidence 
The fo llowing section analyzes regional and loan scheme differences in default 
incidence. The default analysis is presented based on the following demographic and loan 
characteristics: borrower demographic characteristics: geographic location, age, farm size, 
and employment status and loan characteristics: purpose, interest rates. Joan duration. 
repayment mode, loan sequence (new borrowers and borrowers with loans other than the 
first), and installment season. 
Regional differences 
Default incidence and geographic location 
The North Rift area led all areas in default rate for AFC Joans and the Mt. Kenya area 
had the highest incidence of defaults in terms of absolute numbers (Table 4.9). Maize 
production is the leading enterprise financed in the North Rift area. Because maize is a staple 
food crop, perhaps most of the maize produced is consumed by the borrowers ' families, or 
perhaps the gross income level is not adequate to service debts. 
The leading enterprise for defaulted loans in each area, shown in Table 4 .9, is 
determined by comparing relative default within the area by enterprise. In other words, it is 
the percentage default rate, by enterprise, in a given area. 
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Table 4.9. Default rate, by AFC area and leading enterprise 
Absolute Asa 
Number of Proportion Mean 
Loans of All Default Rate Leading 
Accounts in Defaulted by Area Enterprise in 
Area Default Accounts (%) Default 
North Rift 253 12 65 Maize 
South Rift 97 5 63 Dairy 
Nyanza 135 7 62 Dairy 
Mt. Kenya 593 30 60 Poultry 
Coast 43 2 58 Dairy 
Western 299 15 57 Maize 
Eastern 320 16 57 Dairy 
Central Rift 251 13 45 Dairy 
Total 1,991 100.0 
Loan scheme differences 
Default incidence and enterprise financed 
Although eighteen enterprises are fi nanced by AFC, AFC has not adequately 
diversified its lending. As shown in Table 4.10, of the eighteen enterprises financed, five 
enterprises each held less than a I percent share of total loans and together held 2.2 percent of 
all Joans during the study period. Six enterprises held less than a 2 percent share each and 
together held 6.3 percent of all loans. These eleven enterprises represented 61 percent of the 
eighteen enterprises financed by AFC, yet held only of 8.5 percent of all accounts. The next 
four enterprises each held Jess than 5 percent of total Joans but collectively held 22.1 percent 
of all loans. The last three enterprises--dairy (40.5 percent), maize (18.4 percent), and 
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poultry (I 0.4 percent)--held 69.3 percent of all accounts . These figures show that AFC is 
likely to be vulnerable to production and price risks because its portfolio is not adequately 
versified. 
Seasonal crops, excluding maize, wheat and horticultural crops had the highest 
default rate, at 77 percent. Beef productjon and refinancing of bank loans had default rates of 
75 percent each. Other permanent crops, excluding tea, coffee, and fruit trees, had the lowest 
default rate, at 25 percent. Each enterprise had a relative default rate above 60 percent. 
Short-term loans and default incidence 
The default ratios are broken down into two main categories: 0 or Jess (current 
accounts) and greater than 0 (defaulters). Defaulters are further broken down into four ratio 
categories: greater than 0 - 0.1 0.1 - 0.35, 0.35 - 0. 75, and above 0. 75 of arrears. These 
categories are relative default ratios calculated by dividing loan amounts by outstanding 
arrears. Within enterprises default intensity varies with the enterprise financed (Table 4.10). 
Short-term credit (excluding maize and wheat) showed the highest default during the period 
studied, with a default rate of 23 percent in the above 0.75 relative default category. 
Table 4.10 shows the intensity of default for AFC schemes by the four default 
categories and by enterprise. The AFC scheme defaulted loans are spread across the 
categories, while SCCS loans tend to have default concentrated at the extreme ends. At the 
lower end of the SCCS, a recovery rate of90 percent was probably attained. At the upper 
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Table 4. 10. Default intensity for AFC schemes, by enterprise 
Default Ratio Categories 
And Number of Loan Accounts in Each Category 
Loan Purpose --.:r00.1--0~1---0~35 ___ o35~o~5----A:iJo-veo)5--
Beef 8 17 42 
Coffee 14 22 18 
Dairy 15 23 14 
Fruits 15 8 15 
Horticultural Crops 9 22 22 
Infrastructure 15 20 18 
Land Purchase 10 32 6 
Machinery 33 8 0 
Other Livestock 21 I 1 25 
Other Permanent Crops 0 0 25 
Other Seasonal Crops 15 23 15 
Pigs 16 19 11 
Poultry 11 18 15 
Semi-Permanent Crops 5 14 22 
Special Projects 0 25 50 
Tea 22 2 7 
Total Defaulters 222 314 242 
Table 4.11 . Default intensity, by AFC schemes and SCCS loans 
Default Ratio 
Category 
Below or equal to 0 (Current borrowers) 
To 0.10 
0.1 - 0.35 
0.35 - 0.75 
Above 0.75 
Default within AFC 
Schemes 
(Large Scale and 
Small Scale) (%) 
42.5 
14. l 
20.0 
15.4 
8.0 
8 
8 
5 
23 
13 
11 
0 
8 
7 
0 
23 
18 
16 
7 
0 
2 
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Default Within 
secs (maize and 
wheat)(%) 
40.2 
18.8 
4.0 
6.3 
30.7 
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end, 22 percent of the 1993 seasonal crop installments were still in process when the data 
were collected, probably affecting this end. For borrowers in default on earlier loans, the 
default rate is estimated at be less than 90 percent. Table 4 .11 summarizes default by 
considering onJy AFC schemes and SCCS. The same trend in default is observed. 
Default incidence and the SCCS (maize and wheat) 
By removing the 1993 seasonal crop credit, the default rate remained the same, 
perhaps because most of the 1993 loans were not due for repayment. The 1993 crop held 5 
percent of the total loans, with most of the installment scheduled for payment between 
January and March. Distribution of seasonal crop loans by area indicates that the Coast and 
Eastern areas are not providing this type of loan. The Western area provided 37 percent of all 
maize loans, and the North Rift area was second, providing 29 percent of all maize loans 
(Table 4 .12). 
Table 4.12. Distribution of seasonal crop credit by area 
Area Maize(%) Wheat (%) 
Central Rift 5 0.0 
Mt. Kenya 4 2.0 
North Rift 29 6.0 
Nyanza I 0 .2 
South Rift 2 2 .0 
Western 37 0.2 
Tota l (%) 
15.0 
6.0 
35 .0 
1.2 
4.0 
37.2 
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Table 4.1 3. Default intensity for maize and wheat 
Ratio of Default to Loan Amount 
and the Number of Loan Accounts in Each Category 
Loan Purpose --foo.1----0.1-=03s _____ o3s-=o:is _____ A."bo~e-o.7s - -
Maize 
Wheat 
18 3 6 34 
21 6 6 18 
Total Number in Default 
Without 1993 SCCS 
Maize 
Wheat 
90 
18 
21 
19 
4 
5 
30 
6 
5 
Default incidence and borrower characteristics for SCCS loans 
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34 
18 
Default was intensive among maize producers (Table 4.13).34 maize borrowers were 
under category 0.75 default rate as compared to 18 wheat borrowers. Table 4 .14 shows a 
summary of default incidence across several Joan and borrower characteristics. Farm size has 
a strong effect on default, large farms have higher default rates than do small farms. 
Borrowers with special regular repayment remittances from wages, marketing boards, and 
banks and employed borrowers have lower default rates. Age of the borrower seems to have 
insignificant differences in default rate, although younger borrowers show a somewhat lower 
overall default rate. Seasonal crop default across age groups show that the default rate for 
older borrowers' was smaller than that of younger borrowers. 
For further insights into identifying sources of default, Table 4.15 summarizes the 
characteristics discussed so far and compares defaulters and nondefaulters. 
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Table 4.14. A summary of default rate, by loan and borrower demographic characteristics 
Proportion Default 
Number of of Default Rate 
Characteristic Accounts Across Within 
Characteristic Categories in Default Category Category a 
Demographic Characteristics 
Age Group (Years) 24-35 85 7 47 
36-45 350 30 58 
46-55 376 31 61 
Over 55 381 32 58 
Total 1192 100 
Employment Status Unemployed 887 73 59 
Employed 305 27 55 
Total 1,192 100 
Farm Size (ha) 0.0 - 1.0 340 27 61 
1.0 - 2.5 315 29 53 
2.5 - 3.5 98 9 55 
3.5 - 5.0 108 8 62 
5.0 - 10.0 129 l I 57 
10.0 - 20.0 84 7 61 
20.0 - 35.0 29 2 74 
Over 35.0 89 7 62 
Total 1,192 100 
Loan Characteristics 
Loan Sequence New loans 528 44 59 
Second loans 257 21 60 
Third and 407 35 57 
above 
Total 1, 192 100 
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Table 4.14. (continued) 
Proportion of Default 
Number of Default Rate 
Characteristic Accounts in Across Within 
Characteristic Categories Default Category Category 
Loan Characteristics 
Installment Season Jan-March 413 34 60 
April-June 252 21 60 
July-Sep 189 16 53 
Oct.-Dec. 338 28 58 
Total 1,192 100 
Interest Rate (%) 12 775 65 57 
13 123 10 59 
14 4 0.3 57 
17 290 24 60 
Total 1,192 100 
Repayment Mode Irrevocable order 
Open end 317 30 52 
875 70 61 
Total 1, 192 100 
Loan Scheme AFC Schemes 905 77 58 
Seasonal Crops 287 23 60 
Total 1, 192 100 
8The default rate is obtained by considering the proportion of borrowers within that category 
out of the total observations (2,050 loans) and calculating the proportion of borrowers in 
default within the category. 
Table 4.15 Comparative means of defaulters and nondefaulters, by loan type 
Defaulters Nondefau hers 
Small Large Small Large 
SCCS Scale Scale secs Scale Scale 
Repayment Performance 0 0 0 0 0 
Loan Amount (Ksh) 163,412 26,530 1,377,011 22 1,059 26,652 1,933,328 
Lnterest Rate(%) 17 12 12 17 12 12 
Duration (Yr) 15 52 123 IS 52 97 
Installment (Ksh) 97,453 8, 106 293,362 100,587 8, 130 352,035 
Overdue (Ksh) 34,373 8,S 17 448,274 0 0 0 
Installment Season (quarters) I 2 ... .) I 2 2 
Repayment Mode I 2 2 2 I 
Penalty (Ksh) 7.682 880 43 ,066 0 0 0 
Loan Sequence 3 2 2 ... .) 2 2 
Farm Size (Ha) 33 2 644 64 2 179 
Security Value (Ksh) 3,837 220 6,430 838 196 11 ,553 VJ 
Other Assets (Ksh) 988,387 122,249 NA 764,912 173,467 NA 
Total Debt ffotal Assets (Ksh/Ksh) 144 267 235 199 235 23 1 
Current Debtffotal Debt(ksh/Ksh) 0 0 I 0 0 
Net Farm Income (KshO 140,553 46,442 1,089, 164 130,015 50, 122 NA 
Off Farm Income (Ksh) 24,058 38,823 235,333 37,754 45.903 NA 
Fam ily Expenses (Ksh) 77.497 24,858 37,500 30,476 26,0 14 NA 
Age (Yr) 55 49 47 57 47 40 
Manager I 3 I NA 
Experience (Yr) 17 13 10 17 12 NA 
Dependents (No.) 7 6 2 6 7 NA 
Employment Status I I I 2 
Education 3 3 4 2 3 NA 
NA = not available; Manager: I = borrower, 2 = borrower's relative, 3 = hired manager. 
Emloyment status: I= unemployed, 2 = employed and Education: I = primary, 2 =secondary/high school, 3 college, 4 university. 
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Influential Variables 
Default incidence and intensity has been shown to be influenced by characteristics 
that can be grouped into two major categories: demographic characteristics of the borrower 
and loan-related characteristics. The demographic characteristics of the borrower include 
geographic location, age, employment status, and farm size. Loan-related characteristics 
include loan amount, the enterprise/project financed, security value, if new/existing client. 
repayment mode, installment schedule (the season of the payments, duration, and age of the 
loan from inception), and the debt-to-asset ratio. The location of the borrower can be 
considered as a proxy for quality of services the branch offices in the area provide the 
borrower and the agricultural suitability of the financed enterprises. 
Variables identified as influential in previous studies (for example, debt-to-asset ratio, 
collateral, and regional characteristics) were found to be influential for this dataset. Other 
potential explanatory variables found to be influential, such as repayment mode and season, 
are included in the empirical analysis. Thus, loan default can be defined as: 
/(demographic characteristics and loan characteristics of rhe borrower) 
The next section estimates the influence of these variables on repayment performance. 
The dependent and independent variables are defined for the estimation model and the 
relationship of each independent variable in explaining the dependent variable is 
hypothesized. 
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Identification of the Procedure and Specification of Variables for Predicting 
Loan Repayment Performance 
Dependent variables 
Observed distribution of repayment performance by borrowers is important in 
specifying the prediction model. At the extreme ends. some borrowers made absolutely no 
payment, some made full repayment. In between, some borrowers made partial payments. A 
0 value indicates that a borrower has no arrears, or perfect performance. Above 0, relative 
performance value is continuous and may increases infinitely (Figure 4.2) . However, it is 
argued here that many borrowers differ in their repayment capacity from those who have 
perfect repayment, and therefore their relative abilities to repay differed. Again. the 
information on the characteristics of borrowers who have good repayment performance is an 
additional insight into distinguishing good and bad borrowers. 
Maddala (1983) and Green (1992) discuss models to use when data is truncated. 
Green points out that the mean and the variance of the truncated random variable is of 
particular interest. If the truncation is from below, the mean of the variable will be greater 
than the mean of the original and vise versa. Truncation reduces the variance compared to 
the variance of the untruncated distribution. 
Another characteristic of the dependent variable is that it is censored (Green. 1992; 
Maddala, 1983) because values in the 0 range (perfect repayment performance) are 
transformed and reported as a single value, although repayment capacity of borrowers is 
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believed to differ. The conventional regression methods therefore fail to account for the limit 
(zero) and the nonlimit (continuous) observations. 
The dependent variable is defined as relative loan repayment performance. It is a 
continuous variable that measure each borrower' s performance based on sample relative 
default, represented by REP EFO 
Independent explanatory variables 
Independent variables include demographic characteristics of the borrower and loan-
related variables. Dummy variables for regional effects are included to measure covariance 
in performance between regions. 
AFC areas serving the borrower (AREA) 
The AREA variables is a dummy with eight levels based on the eight operational areas 
adopted by AFC (1 = Eastern (intercept), 2 =Mt. Kenya, 3 = North Rift, 4 = Coast, 5 = 
Central Rift, 6 =Western, 7 = Nyanza, 8 =South Rift. Borrowers face similar loan 
conditions and regulations in the eight areas, but are served by personnel with potentially 
differing work ethics, discipline and efficiency. The variable AREA is included to reflect 
such differences. 
AREA also provides insight into the geographic location of the borrower and 
information regarding land rights, which in turn affect collateral markets. For example, 
borrowers operating within the traditional farming areas are most likely to default. On the 
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other hand, the settlement areas and traditional farming areas that support export cash crops 
are likely to show superior repayment performance. Location and type of crop enterprise are 
correlated such that a borrower within the traditional area who grows an export cash crop is 
likely to be a current borrower within the area. In this case, nondefault within the traditional 
areas may be interpreted as an enterprise effect. 
Areas with high SCCS accounts, for example. western with 15 of accounts. are likely 
to have hjgher incidence of default on AFC schemes than do areas with less SCCS accounts. 
The higher the number of AFC staff members. the more likely an area will show good 
performance. Differences in staffing are also expected to explain some regional differences 
(see farm location effects hypothesized above) . 
Borrower off-farm employment status (EMPLO>? 
It is hypothesized that employed borrowers have lower default rates than do the 
unemployed. This variable is a dummy with two levels ( 1 if employed, 0 otherwise). 
Purpose of loan funds (ENTP) 
Staple food crop producers have higher incidences of default than do export and cash 
crop producers. Infrastructure, Ii fting of bank mortgages, and machinery loans are 
hypothesized to be positively related to default. The ENTP dummy has six levels for small-
scale loans and three levels for large-scale loans. Small-scale loan enterprise dummies are: I 
= dairy, 2 = livestock, 3 = permanent and semi-permanent crops, 4 =other seasonal crops and 
horticultural crops, 5 = special investments: lifting of bank mortgage. machinery, and 
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contractor loans, and 6 = infrastructure loans. Large-scale loan enterprise dummies are 1 = 
dairy, 2 = livestock, and 3 = special investments: lifting of bank mortgages, machinery, and 
contract loans. 
Wheat and maize (CROP) 
CROP is a dummy for seasonal crop loans only (1 =wheat, 0 otherwise). 
Loan installment repayment mode (RMODE) 
Borrowers with special repayment arrangements in the form of standing orders have 
lower default rates. RMODE is a dummy variable with two levels (l = periodic remittances 
from wages, salary, marketing board, or banker, 0 otherwise). 
Loan sequence (LNUMB) 
A longer time relationship (new borrowers vs old borrowers) is negatively related to 
default. This dummy has two levels (1 =new borrower, 0 otherwise). 
Loan installment season (INSEASON) 
Income streams are often irregular or have seasonal patterns. AFC prepares a 
constant repayment schedule, which is figured at the time of loan approval. Depending on 
the season, borrowers may run into difficulties trying to meet installment payments. For 
example, installments that coincide with seasonal cash needs have high chances of default. 
During school opening months (end of January, April, August, and December), which are 
holiday seasons, repayment performance is poor. Installments which are matched with 
income flows and at the same time avoid peak seasonal cash demands are expected to 
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perform better. Effects of tills variable are expected to differ wi th each enterpri se. These 
effects are more pronounced on seasonal credit loans than on other types of loans. The 
installment season is a dummy with three levels (1 = January to April , 2 = May to August 3 
= September to December). 
Borrower age in years (AGE) 
For long term loans, older borrowers are more likely to default; the reverse is 
hypothesized for short-term Joans. Overall, older borrowers are more likely to default than 
are younger borrowers. Age is specified as a continuous variable. 
Loan amount, expressed in (Ksh) (LAMOUNT) 
LAMOUNT is expected to be positively related to default. This variable is 
continuous. 
Loan duration in months (DURATION) 
Longer-term small-scale debts have higher default rates than do shorter-term small-
scale loans. The opposite applies for large-scale loans. This variable is continuous. 
The size of the loan farm in hectares (FRSIZE) 
This variable is positively related to default. FRSIZE takes on continuous values. 
The value of/and plus improvements offered as collateral (SEC VA LUE) 
The collateral variable represents the security offered to secure the loan in Ksh. It is 
hypothesized that the security value is negatively related to default SECVALUE is a 
continuous variable. 
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The age of the loan in years (LO 'AGE) 
This variable is hypothesized to be positively related to default. LONAGE is a 
continuous variable. 
Total debt ! total assets: Ksh. /Ksh. (TDTA) 
This variable is expected to be negatively correlated to default. TDTA is a continuous 
variable. 
While the in-sample statistics provide some evidence and insights about the factors 
that influence loan repayment, the actual values of the influential variables can also be 
obtained using appropriate statistical methods of analysis. The variables identified above are 
incorporated in a model of the form : 
Y*= B'X + e, 
where Y* is the dependent variable, X is a vector of explanatory variables, and e is a random 
error term. 
Explanation of the estimation method 
This section explains the method of estimation for the model conceptualized in 
Chapter 3. The econometric method for the analysis is based on the observed distribution of 
repayment performance by borrowers (the dependent variable). Figures 4.2a, 4.2b and 4.2c 
show the distribution of the dependent variables for small-scale, seasonal crop credit, and 
large-scale loans respectively. From the figures, it can be clearly observed that the 
distribution of the dependent variable for each of the loan types .is truncated at zero. Tobit 
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( 1958; Maddala. 1983; and Green 1992) suggested the estimation of the censored truncated 
tobit model by maximwn likelihood method. Regressing the dependent variable on the 
independent vari ables by ordinary least squares (OLS) may yield inconsistent parameter 
estimates due to truncation of observed repayment at zero. OLS is therefore inappropriate for 
estimating repayment performance when borrowers with zero default rate are taken into 
account. 
Tobin, considered the first to use the censored truncated model, estimated incomes 
above or below a poverty line. Censored truncation occurs when sample data are drawn from 
a distribution that is limited in its range (Maddala, 1983; Green, 1992). Suppose that the 
sample of interest consist of observations above the poverty line so that all observations 
below the poverty line are lwnped together and reported as if they are all at the poverty line. 
The distribution of the sample would therefore be truncated at the poverty line. 
The censored truncated tobit model is selected over other methods because the 
censored values of interest introduce a distortion and bias in conventional OLS methods 
(Maddala, 1983). Maddala (1983) and Green (1992) recommend this method for 
investigating decision-making behavior when the variable of interest is limited in range. The 
method has also been successfully used in predicting demand for goods using household 
income data. Unlike pure truncation, censoring is a defect in the data in the sense that the 
dependent variable in the truncated section is unobserved whi le the independent variables are 
observable. 
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For the dependent variable in this study, the distribution of repayment performance is 
censored and truncated at 0.0. Instead of treating all borrowers who have zero arrears as if 
they had equal repayment capacity, the model assumes that they differed in their capacity to 
repay. Because similar infonnation on explanatory variables for both current and defaulting 
borrowers is available, further insights can be obtained in inferring sources of defaul t. The 
implication of this method is that repayment perfonnance assumes continuous normal 
distribution and has a truncation at 0.0. 
The model is derived from an underlying classical linear regression, 
Y* = B'X + e, 
2 e - N(O, a ) 
in which Y* (repayment capacity) is not directly observed. The observed counterpart is a 
variable Y which is either censored or truncated with respect to Y* (Green, 1990). The 
censored range of .Y* (accounts that show zero arrears) is the half of the line below 0.0. If Y* 
is not observed, a 0 is observed for Y, otherwise the observation is .Y* (accounts with positive 
arrears). Maddala (1983) extended and simplified the application of these models. 
Censored truncated /obit model 
Y = xP+µ ifY > 0 
Y=O otherwise (4.1) 
where Y are the accounts with positive arrears and Xis a set of explanatory variables. 
Maddala (1983) provided an alternative fonnulation for the tenn of the index function by 
letting Ybe the expenditure the individual can afford (analogous to repayment capacity) and 
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Y* the-threshold expenditure (the price of the most inexpensive automobile acceptable to 
the individual. In this case, the level of repayment the borrower can handle): 
Y· = Y* 1 if Y.* > 0 l (4.2) 
Observed repayment are Y if Y > Y* and 0 otherwise. In this case, the formulation of the 
threshold Y* is not necessarily zero and can vary from individual to individual. Among those 
who have arrears, there is a wide variation in the weighted arrears. 
Suppose Y, has a normal distribution with mean µ and variance o 2. 
y = Wxi + µi ifRHS > 0 
otherwise (4.3) 
are, respectively, density function and distribution function of the standard normal evaluated 
at P'x(cr. 
For the observed yi that are zero, all we know is that 
For the observations for yi that are greater than zero, we have 
• f (y, - p I x_., CJ 2) 
Prob(y1 > 0) . f(y ,Iy. > 0) = F.-----
F. 
Estimation of this model has become routine with computers. For this analysis, the 
LIMDEP (Green, 1992) computer package is used. 
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Model spec!fication 
Using the preceding statistical formulation, the equations specified below are 
estimated to test the probability of loan default. The equations are specified for each loan 
category. 
The loans are divided into three categories: small-scale loans, seasonal crop credit 
scheme for maize and wheat , and large-scale loans . This system follows AFC's loan 
classification, which groups loans into categories with close similarity. For example, in 
small-scale loan category the maximum loan a borrower can receive is Ksh.50,000. Farm 
size is also limited to 20 hectares. Although loan duration ranges between three to five years, 
a few cases have a duration outside this range. Loan classification therefore reduce the range 
of important variables such as loan amount. 
The variables selected were judged mainly from the descriptive analysis of default 
across various candidate variables and from the literature reviewed in chapter 3. 
Interestingly, the trends in the descriptive analysis supported what literature supported the 
default factors cited in the literature. Correlation matrix analysis helped in eliminate 
explanatory variables that contributed duplicate information. Another elimination and 
selection strategy was reliance on outside information. For example, beef loans are believed 
to be problematic due to constant drought and marketing problems. This dummy variable 
was expected to the increase probability of default. 
Another elimination strategy was the chow likelihood test on the reduced model and 
full model (Pyndick and Rubinfeld 1981 ) and the t-test on the individual coefficients. This 
146 
strategy was useful for the regional enterprise dummy variables. which are a major 
components of the models. Different censured truncated tobit model equations are used for 
each loan type. The specifications differ due to data limitations and observed trends in the 
variables in the descriptive analysis. 
REPEFO[ssd = ex. + P1AREA + P2EMPLOY + P3LNUMB + P4ENTP 
+ p5RMODE + P6INSEASON + PaAGE + P~GE2 +P1oLONAGE 
+ P11DURATION + P11LAMOUNT + p13FRSJZE 
+ P14FRSIZE + P15SECVALUE + P16CDTD + P17TDTA (4.4) 
REPEFO[sccs] = ex. + P1AREA + P2EMPLOY + P3LNUMB + P4CROP + P5RMODE + 
+ P/NSEASON + P7AGE + P8LAMOUNT +p~RSIZE 
+ PJOFRSIZF! + PwSECVALUE + P11TDTA 
REPEFO[LSd =ex.+ P2EMPLOY + P1LNUMB + p4ENTP 
+ PaAGE + P~GE2 +P,oLONAGE 
+ P11DURATJON + P12LAMOUNT + P14FRSJZE 
(4.5) 
+ P15FRSJZF + P16SECVALUE + P17CDTD + P1TDTA (4.6) 
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where a is a constant and 13s are total effects of (a) the change in the probability that the 
borrower will perform at a given level, and (b) the change in the value of default given that 
the perfo rmance is at that level. 
Summary 
In this chapter, a framework for identifying fac tors that influence loan repayment is 
outlined. The models specified in (4.4) , (4.5), and (4.6) represent a Joan decision model for 
the sample by loan scheme. The analysis that follows attaches values to the selected 
variables. Any variable found to be statistically significant is incorporated in a the final loan 
repayment prediction study. 
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CHAPTER 5. EMPIRICAL RE ULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The main objective of this study is to identify factors that influence loan repayment to 
AFC. This chapter presents the results of the analysis and discusses parameter estimates, 
marginal effects, elasticity of the regression, and model fit.. Policy implications of the 
findings and suggestions for future research are also presented. 
Three equations specified in Chapter 4, (4.4), (4 .5), (4.6), were estimated, one fo r 
each loan scheme. Different equations for each loan scheme were specified based on the 
descriptive statistics of the data discussed in Chapter 4 and on statistical tests on the 
contributions of the variables to the model. especially for the dummy variables. For each 
model, a Chow likelihood test (Pyndick and Rubinfeld, 1981) was perfonned on the dummy 
variables to confinn whether they contributed infonnation for predicting repayment 
perfonnance. The Chow likelihood test compares the sum of squares associated with two 
models (a reduced and full model). Because a reduced model involves more parameter 
restrictions than does the full model, the error sums of squares for the reduced model would 
be higher than that of the full model. 
A comparison of the ratio of the differences leads to the decision of which variables 
to include in the final model. The Chow likelihood test eliminated regional and enterpri se 
dummies in the large-scale loan model loan model. Also, due to the small dataset for the 
lagre-scale, inclusion of the large number of variables resulted in loss of degrees of freedom . 
To test the contribution of individual variables, at-test on individual p coefficients was used. 
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The dummy variables measure the change in the repayment performance intercept (with 
respect to the fust dummy). 
The results were obtained using the maximum likel ihood of the censored truncated 
tobit model generated by LIMDEP econometric software (Green, 1992). The results for 
each of the three equations are reported in Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 for each loan type. For 
each model, a Chow likelihood test (Pyndick and Rubinfeld, 1981 ) was used to see whether 
the dummy variables contribute information for predicting repayment performance. Further, 
t-tests on individual p coefficients were used to test whether each variable contributes 
information to the models. 
The model prediction results have three components: the latent default rate 
(unobserved), the observed default rate given the information that it is greater than zero, and 
the observed default rate not given any such information (Maddala, 1983; Green, 1990; 
Green 1992). The variable coefficients are the total effect of two components: the 
probability that the borrower will default, and the change in the value of the actual default 
rate for those predicted as defaulting (Maddala, 1983). 
For further interpretation, marginal effects1•2 and elasticities3 at the means are 
calculated separately. The marginal effect of a variable is the partial derivetive of the 
variable coefficient with respect to itself, holding all other variables constant. It can be 
interpreted as the effect of the variable on the dependent variable when all other variables are 
held constant. There are differences in the marginal effects in the model coefficients for the 
true default rate and the censored default rate. Elasticities at the means are 
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Table 5.1. Maximum likelihood estimates for the repayment performance for small-scale 
loans 
Coefficient Marginal Elasticity at 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Effect the Mean 
Constant -0.41958 -1.9830 
AREA2 0.06821 **a 2.2910 0.012129 0.13212 
AREA3 0.11319** 2.2930 0.003157 0.03439 
AREA4 0.01812 0.2530 0.000213 0.00232 
AREAS -0.02486 -0.5750 -0.001339 -0.01459 
AREA6 0.07642 1.6890 0.002737 0.02982 
AREA7 0.17242* 3.9570 0.006504 0.07085 
AREA8 0.02597 0.5410 0.000881 0.00960 
EMPLOY -0.07492* -3 .1660 -0.011042 -0.12028 
LNUMB -0.01339 -0.5730 -0.002830 -0.03083 
ENTP 2 0.14956* 4.8540 0.015834 0.17248 
ENTP3 -0.01 746 -0.4340 -0.000753 -0.00820 
ENTP4 0.01989 0.4350 0.000605 0.00659 
ENTP5 -0.12186 -1.1030 -0.0006 18 -0.00673 
ENTP6 0.05721 1.2820 0.001686 0.01837 
RMODE2 0.06178 2.5290 0.020640 0.22484 
INSEASON 2 -0.06988* -2.5860 -0.009902 -0. l 0786 
fNSEASON 3 -0.07121* -2.8320 -0.013362 -0.14556 
AGE 0.01123*** 1.4440 0.259185 2.82337 
AGE2 -0.0105 -1.3790 -0 .123829 -1.34890 
LONA GE 0.12905* 15.32 10 0.183337 1.99714 
DURATION -0.00657* -6. 1800 -0.160485 -1.74820 
LAMOUNT -0.00164 -1 .0050 -0.020627 -0.22469 
INSTALMT -0.002 19 -0.6040 -0.008391 -0.09141 
FRSIZE 0.01553** 2.2460 0.017960 0.19564 
FRSIZE2 -0.04626** -1 .9360 -0.004438 -0.04834 
SECVALUE 0.00347 0.3800 0.000343 0.00374 
TDTA 0.34627* 5. 1700 0.041646 0.45366 
s 0.35994 37.9300 
Sample size= 1,491 
* Significant at the 1 percent level. ** = significant at the 5 percent level. *** =significant at 
the l 0 percent level. 
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Table 5.2. Maximum likelihood estimates for the repayment performance fo r seasonal crop 
credit scheme 
Variable Coefficient 
Constant 0.60708 
AREA2 -0.14595 
AREA3 -0.11528 
EMPLOY 2 0.02902 
LNUMB 2 0.00349 
RMODE 2 0.023 78 
JNSEASON 2 0.34998* 
TNSEASON 3 0.4329* 
AGE -0.0067* 
CROPT 2 -0.23357* 
LAMOUNT -0.00006 
FRSIZE 0.00013 
FRSIZE2 -0 .00001 
SECVALUE 0.00035 
TDTA -0.4802* 
s 0.59401 
Sample size 473 
*Significant at the I percent level. 
Coefficient 
t-Ratio 
2.909 
-1 .080 
-0.823 
0.293 
0.035 
0.302 
3.282 
5.176 
-2.634 
-2.715 
-0.448 
0.156 
-0.212 
0.448 
-2.743 
21.710 
Marginal 
Effect 
-0. J 5557 
-0.17229 
0.14509 
0.00231 
0.01969 
2.23825 
1.60873 
-0.00007 
-0.66220 
0.00000 
0.00000 
0.00000 
0.00008 
-1.72774 
Elasticity at 
the Mean 
-0.02845 
-0.02247 
0.005656 
0.000681 
0.004634 
0.068211 
0.084372 
-0.001310 
-0.045520 
-1.20E-05 
0.000025 
-I .OOE-06 
0.000068 
-0.093590 
Table 5.3 . Maximum likelihood estimates for the repayment performance for large scale 
loans 
Coefficient Marginal Elasticity at 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Effects the Means 
Constant -0.48393 -1.47600 
ENTP2 0.09120 0.94200 0.07923 0.150236 
ENTP5 -0.05870 -0.53400 -0 .05102 -0.102799 
RMODE2 -0.05470 -0.63400 -0.04753 -0.063837 
AGE 0.00400 0.32100 0.00348 0.000057 
AGE2 0.00277 0.19100 0.00241 0.000083 
LON AGE 0.14703*3 4.28000 0.12771 0.032957 
DURATION 0.00105 1.31600 0.00091 0.000006 
LAMOUNT -0.00006** -1 .90000 -0.00006 0.000000 
INSTALMT 0.00044* 3.25800 0.00038 0.000001 
FRSIZE -0.00051 -1.24100 -0.00044 -0 .000001 
FRSJZE2 0.00001 1.34700 0.00001 0.000000 
COTO 0.01880 0.06700 0.01634 0.042857 
TOTA -0.474 12* -1.97500 -0.41182 -1.177112 
s 0.18647 7.15800 
Sample size 45 
* Significant at the 1 percent level, ** =significant at the 5 percent level. 
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calculated for each variable. 
For the index variable Y* , the marginal effect= 
aE[y.* lx.] 
- - -= P ax. 
For Y given the censoring the marginal effect=. 
aE[y.1 x.] p I xi. 
--=P<D(-). ax. cr 
Elasticity at the mean = 
ay y ___ 
a-x x 
(5 .1) 
(5.2) 
(5.3) 
An elasticity measures the effect of a I percent change in the independent variable, that is, 
the percentage change in repayment performance with respect to a particular variable. 
General consistency was observed for the signs of the parameters. A positive sign on 
the coefficient indicates that the total effect of being a defaulter increases with the value of 
the variable; a negative sign indicates a decrease. Signs on the dummy variables are 
interpreted in a similar manner. The coefficients of the dummy variables other than the 
intercept dummy are interpreted as the differential effects of the intercept dummy relative to 
the variable. For example, the Eastern area is the intercept dummy for small-scale loans. 
The coefficient of the dummy for the Nyanza area is interpreted as the differential effect of 
the Eastern area relative to the Nyanza area . Results on specific loan types are discussed in 
the following sections. 
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Discussion of Results 
Repayment prediction results for small-scale loans 
The results for small-scale loans are presented in Table 5.1. The model groups six 
dummy variables together. Three groups of dummies are regional and enterprise related. Of 
the demographic variables, age and employment status have the expected signs. Loan-related 
factors also seem to have the expected signs. Age of the loan from the first installment date 
(LONA GE), the ratio of total debt to total assets (IDTA), loan amount (LAMOUNT) loan 
installment (INSTALMT), the size of the security farm in hectares (FRSIZE), and the loan 
duration (DURATION) were expected to have positive signs because they reflect financial 
risk. All had the expected signs except for LAMOUNT, JNSTALMT, and DURATION. 
LAMOUNT and INSTALMT did not have statistical significance. DURATION and LONA GE 
were significant implying that default rate declines with duration but intensifies with time. 
Intuitively, the sign in the LONA GE implies that a borrower in default experiences 
difficulties in reversing the situation. The sign of the coefficient of TDTA implies that the 
default rate will increase with an increase in the debt-to-asset ratio. Age of a borrower (AGE) 
shows a positive sign but is statistically insignificant. The curvature term (AGF) indicates 
that the default rate is maximum when the borrower is 53 years of age. The default rate 
increases with age but at a decreasing rate. 
The signs of the coefficients of the regional dummy variables show that all areas have 
positive default probability except the Eastern (AREA I) and Central Rift (AREA 6). The 
coefficients of the two areas , however, have no statistical significance. As expected, Nyanza 
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(A REA 7) shows the strongest positive effect on default. A borrower from Nyanza is more 
likely to default than a borrower from any other region. Nyanza is predominantly subsistence 
farming. Surprisingly, despite the commercial nature of farming in the Mt. Kenya {AREA 2) 
and North Rift (AREA 3) areas, borrowers in these areas are nearly equally as likely to default 
as those in Nyanza. This situation is perhaps due to the problematic beef loans that dominate 
the two regions. The beef industry has been somewhat neglected, and ranchers have low calf 
turnover and a poor marketing system. 
All the enterprises financed show a positive relationship with default (that is, they 
increase default rate) except for permanent and semi-permanent cash crops (ENTP3). Only 
livestock loans (ENTP 2) show a statistically significant positive coefficient. As expected, 
employment (EMPLOY) and borrower reputation (represented by a second or more loans, 
LNUMB 2) reduce default, as shown by the negative signs of the coefficients. Borrowers 
without a special repayment standing order are likely to default. 
Installments scheduled in May through December help reduce default (INSEASON 2 
and INSEASON 3) compared with those scheduled in other months. May marks the 
beginning of harvesting. Farmers have less demand for cash for new entrants into high 
school in September compared to January . The months of January through March have 
higher cash demand, especially because this period marks the beginning of planting season. 
The marginal effects on the true default rate are the coefficient estimates. However, 
the interpretation of the marginal effects of explanatory variables on the true default rate and 
observed default rate are different. For the true default rate, the marginal effect of loan 
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duration, fo r example, can be interpreted as the reduction on the true default rate by 0.00657 
for an increase in duration of one month, all other explanatory variables held constant. 
Repayment prediction results for SCCS loans (maize and wheat) 
Results of the SCCS are presented in Table 5.2. For this Joan category, the two 
regional dummy variables included in the model were expected to show significant 
differences in repayment performance. Both variables reduce the default rate because they 
have negative signs but are not significant. Employment status (EMPLOY 2), loan number 
(LNUMB 2), and repayment mode (RMODE 2) have no significance, although they all have 
positive signs as expected. The installment season variable (INSEASON 2 and JNSEASON 3) 
was expected to increase default. These two variables had expected effects with statistical 
significance. 
Age of the borrower is negatively related to default. Wheat producers (CROP 2) are 
likely to have lower default rate than are maize producers. The amount of loan advanced 
(LAMOUNT), the size of the farm (FRSIZE and FRSIZE), and the value of security 
(SECVA LUE) were not significant. The debt-to-asset ratio (TDTA) was significant, 
indicating that the higher the ratio the more likely a borrower is to default. Elasticity at the 
mean was greatest for installments scheduled between the months of May and August 
(JNSEASON 2). 
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Repayment prediction results for large-scale loans 
The results for large-scale loans are reported in Table 5.3. The enterprise dummy 
variables (ENTP 2) have the expected sign but are insignificant. The dummy for refinancing 
of bank loans, land purchases, and machinery combined (ENTP 5) has an unexpected 
negative sign. This could be explained by the nature of the items financed. For example, 
machinery has a competitive secondary market which allows for ease in enforcing repayment. 
Similarly, purchased land has less social and family pressure and can thus be disposed of 
easily. 
Repayment mode, age, loan duration, and farm size, although not statistically 
significant, have the expected signs. The age of the loan from first installment (LONAGE) is 
significant and has the expected signs. The installment amount also has the expected positive 
sign, which implies that high installment amounts increase the default rate. The debt-to-asset 
ratio is positive and significant. The debt-to-asset ratio (TDTA) has the highest elasticity for 
large-scale loans, and the age of the Joan (LONAGE) ranked second. This was also true for 
marginal effects. 
Comparison of the Three Repayment Prediction Models 
The results of the three models show that loan-related characteristics of borrowers 
significantly influence loan repayment. In all three loan categories, the debt-to-asset ratio 
matters. For small-scale loans, the debt-to-asset ratio increased the probability of default, and 
vise versa for seasonal crop credit loans and large scale loans. This result may imply that 
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small-scale borrowers have smaller or weaker debt capacity than do borrowers using the 
other schemes. Moreover for SCCS, the land and asset levels matter more than for a small-
scale loan which is a medium-term credit. The results show that the age of the loan, 
increases the probability of default for long-term loans. Regional differences also matter for 
small-scale loans· areas where export and cash crops dominate are likely to have lower 
default rates. 
Conclusions 
One major aim of this study is to provide a strategy for reducing default risk at the 
loan-making stage and/or during the project life of a loan already granted. Providing credit to 
small farmers in LDCs is difficult, mainly because of the role agriculture plays in these 
economies. Moreover, the speed required to process loan applications at the beginning of 
cropping seasons does not allow for careful assessment of borrowers. When loans mature for 
collection. lenders have inadequate time to contact and monitor harvesting, delivery, and 
payment of proceeds to farmers, and security for aggressive loan collection. This is because 
aU borrowers harvest at more or less the same time with a huge percentage of the season's 
installments falling due at the same time. It is therefore imperative that lenders formulate 
new strategies that provide efficiency in services without reducing the qua! ity of the loans 
made. This section presents a summary and conclusions. 
As described in Chapter 1, farm credit programs have been characterized by massive 
series of capital infusions to LDCs. These programs were attempts to improve the long-term 
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well -being of rural communities. The observed economic deterioration in most LDCs, 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s, has been quite a disappointing outcome 
considering the amount ofresources already invested. The general characteristics of the 
poorest LDCs include an extremely poor export performance, which is linked to a narrow-
based commodity composition (over 70 percent of the countries rely on a few primary 
commodities), protectionistic measures (for example. pricing and tariff structures that reduce 
the scope of diversification), high population growth (about 3 percent per year), low domestic 
private investment due to declining domestic savings. and growth prospects restrained by 
heavy debt burden (Jepma, 1992). 
Mobilization of domestic financial resources has been difficult because low savings 
as a result of decreasing per capita income and Jack of adequate or efficient rural financial 
institutions. External capital in.flow has general ly been inadequate in meeting government 
financial requirements for development. As a result, there is increasing pressure for 
governments to improve the efficiency and management of financial resources. 
Throughout this study, an attempt has been made to inquire into the factors that 
influence Joan repayment among AFC borrowers, given the reasoning that there is an 
important role for government-sponsored credit in Kenya in the process of economic growth 
and development. As the literature on the performance of farm credit institutions reveals, 
government-sponsored institutions have generally fai led to attain equity and efficiency in 
resource allocation and utilization. This view is strongly supported by several research 
findings (Braverman and Gausch. 1989, and Adam and Von Pischke, 1990, among others). 
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The important place of specialized farm credit institutions in Kenya 's economy is 
clear from the overview of AFC operations presented in Chapter 2. In light of this situation, 
it is most improbable that the society will expect AFC to play a leading role in financial 
intermediation. At the same time, AFC must remain viable and financially stable if farmers 
are to build confidence in AFC as a long-term lender. In the figures showing loan collection 
and approvals, loan repayment increased substantially when farmers were sure of further 
opportunities for borrowing. 
The financial practices of borrowers have been changing with changes in the social 
and politicaJ structure and economic conditions. Such trends require constant adjustments in 
contractual credit relationships. AFC has to recognize, therefore, that the financial practices 
of farmers change and that such changes require appropriate institutional adjustments. 
AFC's potential and the growing awareness of the importance of its ability to influence 
economic activities has Jed to increased concerns about its role in rural financial 
intermediation. More importantly, improvements in its lending capacity to the society as a 
contribution toward economic growth and development is crucial for the future . 
It is against this background that the overview of Kenya in Chapter 2 and the anaJysis 
in Chapter 4 have been undertaken. A statistical analysis of the characteristics that influence 
loan. repayment in Kenya suggest that the probabi lity of loan default is not random; it 
increases with some enterprises and regions, high debt-to-asset ratio and farm size. Default 
will tend to decrease for some enterprises (for example, export crops) and shorter loan 
duration. 
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The results of thi s study high I ight several important factors that should be considered 
when evaluating loan default problems. Default problems are complex, and they encompass 
a wide range of factors within the borrower·s demographic characteristics and loan 
characteristics. It is therefore important for lenders to acquire as much information as 
possible during loan origination and to use such information in identifying causes and 
sources of default. 
Demographic characteristics 
Specific conclusions based on the results of the findings about borrowers' 
demographic information. Loan default among small scale borrowers is explained by regional 
differences which also influence the enterprises which are AFC finances . Enterprise 
diversification should be considered whenever possible with in a region. It is important for 
AFC to attempt as much as possible to avoid loans falling into default, because once they do 
so, it is almost impossible to correct the situation. 
Loan characteristics 
Loan characteristics are important and the study shows that debt to asset ratio is an 
important factor for term loans among small scale borrowers than it is for short-term loans 
and large scale borrowers. This suggests that majority of small farmers have limited resource 
base and have a greater financial risk in long term loan relationship. Farm size is an 
important factor. This implies that very small farmers may require very intensive land use 
program in order to attain a reasonable return to investments. Borrowers with very small 
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farms are more likely to default, and t the relacjonship changes as farms get larger. mall 
scale borrowers benefit from longer repayment schedules. 
Policy implications 
This study has attempted to identify factors that play a role in default problems 
among AFC borrowers in Kenya. Isolating the relative importance of these factors reveals 
their relative influence on default and thus would improve the lenders· decision during credit 
granting. Overall, the use of objective credit repayment prediction methods can enhance 
lending decision efficiency in a more cost-effective way. It eliminates wide variations that 
breed mistrust among borrowers, and reduce the time required to appraise a loan. 
Repayment prediction tools are being advocated on the grounds that they remove 
subjective evaluation methods whjch are often difficult to reference at a later date. They also 
improve the desire of loan officers to know their clients better by collecting information that 
is necessary for such evaluation. 
Research implications 
This study points out that majority of AFC borrowers are defaulting. The results 
emphasize that the highest default is among the seasonal crop producers, particularly maize. 
The majority of term borrowers who default are characterized by low asset value and their 
performance co-vary within regions and the enterprises they are engaged in. It is not certain 
whether this result is unique to our particular sample data. Again, the proportion of large 
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scale borrowers in the sample was relatively small, thereby limiting the predictive power of 
the characteristics that may influence their perfo rmance. 
The results also reveal that security value, which is a highly valued decision tool does 
not matter in repayment performance. The entire sampled borrowers had security pledges 
yet security did not have any statistical significance. A fu ture effort should attempt to 
analyze the role of securities pledged play. Security has always been to provide a means of 
recovering outstanding amounts when borrowers default. However, if the lender' s ability to 
foreclose on defaulted mortgages are limited, it is important to consider other forms of 
pledges~n this study, the effects of farm income was not considered because of data 
limitation. Developing a model that incorporates income variables could improve this study. 
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A. I. Kenya's per capita of land and labor and land/labor ratio in agriculture 
Land Labor Ratio of 
per per land area 
Year capita capita to agri.labor 
1963 0.22 0.12 0.52 
1964 0.23 0.12 0.51 
1965 0.24 0.12 0.49 
1966 0.28 0.1 3 0.46 
1967 0.29 0. 13 0.45 
1968 0.32 0. 14 0.44 
1969 0.34 0. 14 0.41 
1970 0.37 0.15 0.40 
1971 0.41 0.16 0.39 
1972 0.45 0.18 0.39 
1973 0.52 0.20 0.38 
1974 0.61 0.23 0.38 
1975 0.66 0.27 0.42 
1976 0.66 0.33 0.50 
1977 0.79 0.41 0.51 
1978 0.94 0.45 0.48 
1979 0.99 0.47 0.47 
1980 1.14 0.52 0.46 
1981 1.31 0.60 0.45 
1982 1.47 0.67 0.46 
1983 1.73 0.73 0.42 
1984 1.90 0.67 0.35 
1985 2. 13 0.74 0.35 
1986 2.48 0.83 0.34 
1987 2.70 0.90 0.34 
1988 3.08 1.01 0.33 
1989 3.27 1.04 0.32 
1990 3.46 1.07 0.31 
1991 3.46 1.09 0.30 
1992 3.48 1.11 0.30 
Source: FAO Yearbook, U.N Yearbook of national accounts, and World Development 
Report, various years 
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A.2. Distribution of AFC combined large and ranch loans, and small loans portfolio: 
Outstanding unmatured principle 1980-92 (Ksh.) 
Year 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
Large-scale 
and 
Ranch Portfolio 
27,536,929 
29,388,139 
35,959,520 
36,659,861 
39,405,077 
44,593,829 
51 ,699, 153 
62,835, 169 
66 658585 
68,507,816 
65,138,297 
68,074,532 
72,892,573 
Source: AFC annual reports, various years 
Small Loans 
portfolio 
8,445 848 
I 0,658,255 
9,695,173 
9,180,809 
12,072,508 
12,689 523 
17 152,755 
21 777,031 
24 492,172 
24,379,179 
26,976 811 
25, 118,649 
27,179,572 
Total 
Portfolio 
35,982,777 
40,046,394 
45,654,693 
45,840,670 
51 ,477,585 
57,283,352 
68,851 ,908 
84,6 12,200 
91 ,150,757 
92,886,995 
92,115, 108 
93,193,181 
I 00,072, 145 
A.3 Number of borrowers receiving loans by loan scheme: 1980-92 
Fiscal Large Small 
Year scale scale Ranch SCCS 
1980 811 4955 107 4589 
1981 587 1972 68 9435 
1982 452 1585 106 22116 
1983 672 2032 121 16290 
1984 459 4551 109 8252 
1985 484 2721 199 9250 
1986 721 4160 180 7701 
1987 432 3154 130 5133 
1988 183 2140 95 3246 
1989 86 2595 4 2304 
1990 261 2761 74 2355 
1991 11 2 1485 37 1854 
1992 153 1977 55 1053 
Totals 5413 36088 1285 88989 
Source: AFC annual reports, various years 
Total 
5873 
12062 
24259 
19115 
13371 
12654 
12762 
8849 
5664 
4989 
5451 
3488 
3238 
131775 
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A.4 Loan amount approved by loan scheme: 1980-92 (Ksh. 000) 
Large Small 
Year Scale Scale Ranch a sccsc Total 
1980 70,820 51 ,847 32,988 125,400 155,655 
1981 94,642 25,431 43,647 380,100 543,820 
1982 64,846 35,639 21,284 396,200 517,969 
1983 100,331 46,497 19,118 389,100 555,046 
1984 152,154 103.793 49,622 246,600 552,169 
1985 244,921 76,833 33,981 261 ,400 617.135 
1986 120,250 343,876 20.554 256,682 741 ,362 
1987 133,003 105,147 67,429 350,960 656,539 
1988 91 ,952 62,038 19,878 260,068 433,936 
1989 159,347 78,699 30,710 209,793 478,549 
1990 147,899 92,712 15,001 200,262 455.874 
1991 276,952 53 557 12,894 208,509 551 ,912 
1992 233,085 69,312 11,790 184,645 498,832 
Totals 1,890,202 1,145.381 378,896 3,344,319 6,758,798 
Source: AFC Statistical Digest March 1988 and Dec. 1992 
3
Long term-(over 5 years) 
bMedium term (upto 5 years) 
cShort term 
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A.5. Average loans by loan scheme, average loans for all AFC loans (Ksh.000) and ratio of 
small-scale to large-scale loans: 1980-92 
Average Ratio of Ratio of 
Average loans loan Small-scale Small-scale to 
per SCCS per to Large- (Large-scale + 
Year AFC scheme borrower scale loans Ranch loans) 
------~-----~----- -Large- Small-
scale scale Ranch 
1980 87.32 10.46 308.30 27.30 26.50 8.35 37.81 
1981 161.23 12.90 641.87 40.29 45.09 12.50 62.27 
1982 143.46 22.49 200.79 17.91 21.35 6.38 15.31 
1983 149.30 22.88 158.00 23.89 29.04 6.52 13.43 
1984 331.49 22.81 455.25 29.88 41 .30 14.53 34.50 
1985 506.04 28.24 170.76 28.26 48.77 17.92 23.97 
1986 166.78 82.66 114.19 33.33 58.09 2.02 3.40 
1987 307.88 33 .34 518.68 68.37 74.19 9.24 24.79 
1988 502.47 28.99 209.24 80.12 76.61 17.33 24.55 
1989 1852.87 30.33 7677.50 91.06 95.92 61. 10 314.25 
1990 566.66 33.58 202.72 85.04 83.63 16.88 22.91 
1991 2472.79 36.07 348.49 l 12.46 158.23 68.56 78.23 
1992 1523.43 35.06 214.36 175.35 154.06 43.45 49.57 
Source: AFC Annual reports and accounts for the years 1979/80 to 1991 /92 
A.6 Loan collection: 1980-92 (Ksh. 000) 
Small-
Year Large. Scale scale Ranch secs Total 
1980 115,725 54,257 3,186 86,431 259,599 
1981 92,229 44,572 27,386 107,836 272,023 
1982 111,472 52,513 37,976 168,261 370,222 
1983 142,367 75,038 59,632 202,415 479,452 
1984 172,703 60,819 78,766 242,390 554,678 
1985 136,393 65,133 37,140 94,358 333,024 
1986 l 37,737 86,074 41 ,877 358,613 624,301 
1987 177159 83,457 39,849 375,91 1 676,376 
1988 194,206 29,899 47,449 432,347 703,901 
1989 199,517 I 08,998 32,847 225,919 567,281 
1990 150,145 92,645 121 ,175 188,073 552,038 
1991 186,578 118,720 14,923 179,213 499,434 
1992 158,600 100,300 5,300 214,800 479,000 
Total 1,974,831 972,425 547,506 2,876,567 6371329 
